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Aid fragmentation is widely recognized as being detrimental to development outcomes. We 
re-investigate the impact of fragmentation in the context of growth, bureaucratic policy, and 
education, focusing on a number of conceptually different indicators of fragmentation, and 
paying attention to potentially heterogeneous effects across countries, sectors, and channels of 
influence. Our systematic and detailed reexamination of existing empirical studies shows that 
this differentiation is crucial. In some sectors—such as primary education—donor 
concentration or limiting donor numbers appears to be detrimental rather than beneficial for 
development outcomes. In other areas, we find the expected negative effect, but only when we 
conceptualize fragmentation as a lack of lead donors (too limited concentration), rather than 
in terms of donor numbers. In all cases, sufficient initial administrative capacity in recipient 
countries prevents the negative and reinforces the positive effects of fragmentation. This 
stresses the importance of questioning the sweeping conclusions drawn by much of the 
previous literature. Based on what we currently know, generalizing judgements about the 
effect of aid fragmentation may be misleading. 
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• Generalizing judgements about the effect of aid fragmentation can be misleading. 
• While we observe a negative effect of fragmentation on growth, this effect depends on 
the lack of lead donors, rather than on the number of donors.  
• In some sectors—such as primary education—donor fragmentation appears to be 
beneficial rather than detrimental for development outcomes. 
• When the recipients’ administrative capacity is sufficiently high, negative effects are 
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The academic literature widely recognizes aid fragmentation as a significant problem for 
effective development cooperation. With many donors and projects in a given country or 
sector, transaction costs should rise (Acharya, Fuzzo de Lima, and Moore 2006; Anderson 
2012), developing country administrative capacities can be overburdened (Kanbur 2003; 
Roodman 2006), and administrations might be deprived of their best staff (Knack and Rahman 
2007), so that aid supposedly becomes less effective in terms of its impact on economic 
development (Annen and Kosempel 2009; Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol 2009; 
Kimura, Mori, and Sawada 2012). 
 
To mitigate such problems, donors and recipients committed to reducing fragmentation in the 
Paris Declaration (PD) in 2005, the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) in 2008, and the Busan 
Declaration in 2011. The consensus that fragmented aid is generally “bad” aid is, however, 
based on a surprisingly small number of systematic studies. These studies had a remarkable 
effect on development scientists and practitioners alike. Given the general fragility of results 
in the aid effectiveness literature (see Docouliagos 2016, Dreher et al. 2017), the unanimous 
acceptance of the principle “less is more” is surprising. It is also questioned by the recipients 
themselves (Eyben 2007: 642; OECD 2014: 27; Greenhill, Prizzon, and Rogerson 2016: 143). Our 
systematic reexamination—in much more detail than any previous study provides—will shed 
some light on the general results as well as on the specific conditions under which they may 
hold.  
 
By providing this reexamination, we follow a turn in the more recent literature that tries to 
assess the effect of aid fragmentation in a more differentiated way. In a formal model, 
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Bourguignon and Platteau (2015) for instance emphasize the differences between the case in 
which donor and recipient preferences are aligned and the case in which they are not—with a 
particular focus on the recipients’ potential to exploit the donors’ generosity. In addition, 
authors now tend to consider a more complete picture by taking into account donor 
coordination (Pietschmann 2016: 2017), which is the focus of studies, e.g., by Steinwand (2015), 
Bigsten and Tengstam (2015) and Bourguignon and Platteau (2015) (for an earlier study, see 
Torsvik 2005). The concept of donor cooperation or harmonization is related to fragmentation 
in various ways, but even more difficult to operationalize in empirical studies (for a possible 
approximation, see Bigsten 2006, and Bigsten and Tengstam 2015). The collection of recent 
studies by Klingebiel, Mahn, and Negre (2016) provides multiple perspectives on the 
fragmentation of the aid system as a whole, including a balanced discussion of both costs and 
benefits, mostly on the basis of detailed case-study analyses.  
 
The most recent traditional econometric study examining the effect of aid fragmentation is 
Kimura, Mori, and Sawada (2012). While focusing on the positive effect of donor concentration 
on aid effectiveness and, eventually, economic growth, an interesting remark at the end of the 
paper explains that their result holds only for countries receiving a sufficiently large amount 
of aid. The authors suggest that this may be due to the fact that there could also be some 
negative effect of concentration related to less competition or less peer monitoring among 
donors (Kimura, Mori, and Sawada 2012: 6). The authors’ earlier discussion paper (Kimura, 
Sawada, and Mori 2007: 16) is even more explicit in this respect. For the specific case of fragile 
states, where aid inflows are often limited, Gutting and Steinwand (2015) also find a positive 
effect of higher donor numbers. Other authors show similar results in their regression tables, 
but do not discuss the issue due to their focus on the interaction term with aid rather than the 
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fragmentation variable itself (e.g., Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol 2009: Tables 6, 7 
and 8). Generally, this indicates that a greater degree of differentiation is required than the 
conclusions in most of these papers would suggest.  
 
To provide this differentiation, we extend the work of Kimura, Mori, and Sawada (2012) in 
various ways: Based on theoretical considerations about plausible differences in the impact of 
fragmentation, we distinguish between (1) different indicators of fragmentation, (2) different 
aid outcomes, (3) different recipient country contexts, (4) different levels of donor alignment, 
(5) different time periods, and (6) different channels through which fragmentation could affect 
development in recipient countries.  
 
Our main focus is on the distinction between different indicators of fragmentation (in 
Section 2). We show that they are conceptually different, notably due to the relationship 
between the effect of fragmentation and donor coordination, and the way donor coordination 
can be expected to work. In terms of outcome variables, we consider not only economic 
growth, but also school enrolment (since education is a sector which traditionally includes a 
particularly high number of donors), and bureaucratic quality (as many studies suggest that 
the overall negative effect of fragmentation is due to the strain it imposes on local 
administrations). To capture potentially important differences in recipient country 
characteristics, we further differentiate between their initial levels of administrative capacity. 
Regarding the alignment of donor preferences, we consider that common government 
ideology may facilitate coordination, even if the number of donors is high, thereby mitigating 
potential problems implied by fragmentation. Similarly, the distinction between different time 
periods may be relevant given that attempts to move towards greater coordination among 
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donors are fairly recent. Finally, we differentiate between the direct effect of fragmentation 
and the moderating effect of fragmentation via its interaction with the amount of aid received. 
Both of these are used in the extant literature, but they are never compared and the choice 
appears rather arbitrary so far. 
 
In Section 3 we test econometrically whether there is a robust significant relation between these 
fragmentation indicators and the different potential aid outcomes—economic growth, school 
enrolment, and bureaucratic quality. We differ from Kimura, Mori, and Sawada (2012) in that 
we avoid to set up our own preferred estimation models. Rather, for each of our dependent 
variables, we replicate a well-known earlier study and add the different indicators of 
fragmentation. This strategy—also followed by Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol 
(2009)—enables us to avoid any influence a discretionary choice of control variables and 
methods of estimation could have on the coefficient estimates related to fragmentation. In a 
nutshell, we find no robust pattern across our different specifications. While our results 
confirm that fragmentation negatively affects aid effectiveness with respect to growth, this 
effect is driven solely by recipients with low bureaucratic capacity, and by the lack of lead 
donors rather than by a multitude of small donors. In addition, sectoral differentiation is 
essential. We do not find any systematic effects on bureaucratic quality, and we even find 
significant positive effects in the education sector.  
 
In our concluding Section 4 we argue that sweeping conclusions on the harmful effects of 
fragmentation should rather be avoided. We believe that the systematic and differentiated re-
estimation of the relationship between fragmentation and development outcomes is relevant, 
not only from a scientific, but also from a policy perspective. Fragmentation indicators are 
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used in donor rankings, e.g., rankings by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) or rankings by the Center for Global Development, and in DAC peer reviews, and can 
lead to substantial pressure to adjust aid allocation and to focus on only a few core recipients. 
Since the evidence we have is less robust than generally perceived, such pressures may be 
premature. In some cases, they might lead donors to unnecessarily give up aid relationships 
that could have been highly beneficial for the recipient.  
 
2. Theoretical considerations 
It is intuitively plausible that a growing number of intervening partners in development 
cooperation raises transaction costs and represents a burden on developing countries’ 
administrative capacities. At the same time, a greater number of donors active in a country 
may bring up more innovative ideas, allow the recipient government to benefit from a variety 
of experiences, and put the recipient government in a more powerful position to take its own 
decisions, thereby enhancing ownership. Do the negative consequences of fragmentation 
always outweigh the benefits? If not, under which conditions does this happen? And which 
type of indicators best capture these effects? In the following, we provide some theoretical 
considerations in this respect. 
 
2.1. Relevant context factors 
Differences in the impact of fragmentation may be driven by differences in the countries or 
sectors to which aid is allocated as well as to differences in the way a given number of donors 
cooperates within this setting. We discuss these areas one by one, starting with possible 
sectoral differences reflected in different aid outcomes under consideration.  
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2.1.1. Differentiating between aid outcomes 
It is well known that aid fragmentation varies considerably across sectors, with many more 
donors (and individual aid activities) in social sectors than in sectors such as economic 
infrastructure (Frot and Santiso 2010: 21-22; OECD 2009b: 45-52). In health and education, the 
average project is comparably small, in other areas such as industrial infrastructure or 
electricity generation, aid interventions are traditionally much larger.  
 
As a consequence, the social sectors are often perceived as sectors in which the need to reduce 
fragmentation is particularly strong. However, it may also be the case that the natural project 
size in these sectors is smaller, and that recipient countries have developed strategies to deal 
with the multiplicity of small interventions so that the way they translate into transaction costs 
differs from other sectors. This is indeed what sector-specific interviews in Burkina Faso 
suggest (Dreher and Michaelowa 2010: 25-26). In fact, in some sectors, five donors may appear 
to be many, in others, 15 donors may be a number dealt with easily. Apart from differences 
driven by experience with typical project size and donor numbers, coordination of small 
projects or their insertion into a national sector level plan may be genuinely easier in some 
sectors than in others. If coordination is easy, fragmentation should not be too much of a 
concern. Difficulties for donor coordination can be expected primarily where the donors’ own 
national interests such as trade or investment opportunities are concerned, i.e., notably in 
fields such as industry, infrastructure, or resource extraction. These problems should arise 
much less in sectors such as health or education. 
 
We further consider that some areas should be more directly affected by fragmentation than 
others. As most of the negative effects of fragmentation are expected to arise due to increased 
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transaction costs imposed on the recipient country’s government (e.g., Acharya, Fuzzo de 
Lima, and Moore 2006), the country’s administration should be affected most directly. Other 
sectors as well as economic development as a whole may then suffer indirectly from the 
inefficiency of the overburdened bureaucracy.  
 
In the empirical part of this study, we will try to capture the relevant differences between 
sectors by a corresponding differentiation in outcome variables. Given the above arguments 
on the transaction cost imposed on the recipient country administration, we would expect the 
most clearly detrimental effect of fragmentation on bureaucratic quality. Regarding other aid 
outcomes, we will distinguish between economic growth on the one hand, and primary school 
enrolment on the other, in order to contrast the role of fragmentation for aid in general with 
its role in the context of a social sector known for its traditionally high level of fragmentation. 
According to the above discussion, either of these areas could suffer more from fragmentation, 
so we leave this question to the empirical test. 
 
2.1.2. Differentiating between recipients 
Let us now turn to differences in recipient country characteristics. Various recipient 
characteristics could be relevant for the impact of fragmentation, notably the level of existing 
resources, the economic and geopolitical relevance for the donors, and administrative 
capacity. These factors are all related in that they provide the recipient with some strength vis-
à-vis the donors, greater capacity to formulate its own policy, and a greater chance to get this 
policy respected and to rally the donors around this policy. Since we do not have the space to 




A high-capacity government should be more confident about taking its own independent 
decision on how many and which donors to cooperate with in the first place. India, for 
instance, declared in 2003 that it would not accept any tied aid in the future, and that no more 
than a handful of bilateral donors would be welcome in the country anymore (Agrawal 2007: 
4).  
 
Furthermore, a high-capacity country should be able to handle a given number of donors more 
easily than a low-capacity country. In the former, appropriate management processes should 
be up and running and lower-level administrative staff should be enabled to carry out the day-
to-day business, so that it is not left to the ministers and secretaries of state or other high-level 
politicians to welcome every donor mission. This reflects the situation we experienced when 
carrying out comparative case studies in Burkina Faso and Vietnam (Dreher and Michaelowa 
2010). In Vietnam, a number of senior bureaucrats selected as potential interview partners 
indicated that they had better things to do than to talk to us about aid fragmentation. This may 
have been a highly efficient decision on their part. In addition, some Vietnamese officials 
directly stated that they did not regard the multitude of different donors as a disadvantage, 
but rather as an opportunity to collaborate with international partners, in terms of 
development cooperation and beyond. 
 
Overall, the above arguments suggest that recipient countries with higher administrative 
capacity may be able to absorb (or to even benefit from) a degree of fragmentation that may 
be far too high for other aid recipients. The greater their administrative capacity, the less 




2.1.3. Differentiating between donor cooperation styles  
In addition to relevant differentiations related to country and sector characteristics, the effect 
of aid fragmentation cannot be duly examined without taking into account the different modes 
of delivery, including the degree of donor coordination (see also Aldasoro, Nunnenkamp, and 
Thiele 2010). When donors cooperate well with one another, so that they essentially speak with 
one voice, the number of donors involved should no more be of any concern for the recipient 
country. From this perspective, donor coordination could be a substitute for the concentration 
of aid flows. Unfortunately information on the degree of coordination is not directly available 
(Bingsten 2006: 89f.). However, there are more indirect measures that capture some of the 
related aspects. Bingsten and Tengstam (2015) for instance use program based aid (PBA) as an 
indicator. However, this category of aid—separately computed by the DAC since the mid-
2000s—includes host country leadership as a defining criterion (OECD 2010). This is an 
advantage when it comes to measuring the overall alignment with the objectives of Paris, 
Accra and Busan (such as in Bingsten and Tengstam 2015), which do not only consider 
coordination among donors per se, but also the role of the recipient governments. However, 
including this into the definition when assessing the specific effect of fragmentation appears 
to be a disadvantage since one of the most strongly voiced concerns regarding donor 
concentration is precisely that the influence of the recipient may be significantly reduced. It 
then becomes difficult to disentangle the different effects. 
 
Another indirect way to get at donor coordination should be to consider how close different 
donors are ideologically. As Dreher, Minaysan and Nunnenkamp (2015) find that the 
ideological distance between a donor and a recipient country can erode trust and complicate 
cooperation, the same could be true for coordination among the donors within a given host 
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country. Ideological alignment between donor preferences should improve their collaboration. 
Considering donor cooperation as a potential substitute for the concentration of aid flows, we 
hence expect that the negative effects of fragmentation are greater for recipient countries in 
which donors’ preferences are less aligned.  
 
Apart from a differentiation between host countries with a different degree of donor 
alignment, in the empirical part of this study, we will also consider a simple time split of the 
sample so as to take into account that significant efforts regarding donor cooperation have 
only taken place fairly recently. Clearly, this measure will, however, also capture the totality 
of potential effects of the Paris Agenda and even the effects of the end of the Cold War.  
 
In addition, as we will show in the next section, the appropriate choice of the fragmentation 
indicator itself is not independent of the type of coordination expected between donors. 
 
2.2. Different indicators of fragmentation and their implications 
In addition to relevant differentiations related to country and sector characteristics, we should 
expect the choice of the fragmentation indicator itself to play a relevant role for the effects we 
are going to measure. This is because due to their computational properties each possible 
fragmentation indicator captures a different facet of what is usually conceived as 
“fragmentation.” Some indicators primarily focus on the lack of lead donors—one or a few 
dominant donors who may become natural leaders and take over responsibility for the bulk 
of the coordination activities. Others focus on the sheer number of donors, or on marginal 
donors that provide only little financial support while adding to the overall number of 
development partners and, arguably, to the needs of coordination. Whether the lack of a lead 
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donor or the large number of small donors are more relevant for potential problems related to 
fragmentation depends on how cooperation concretely works among donors, and to what 
extent cooperation can mitigate problems related to fragmentation.1 For this reason, the 
appropriate choice of the fragmentation indicator is directly related to the role of donor 
coordination, and different indicators should not be expected to show the same effects.  
 
The most frequently used indicator in the academic literature is based on the Herfindahl index 
(see, e.g., Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol 2009; Easterly 2007; Knack and Rahman 
2007). It originally stems from the industrial organization literature, where it is used as a 
measure of the degree of competition among firms in an industry. In our case, it measures the 
probability that in two random draws of 1 USD from overall aid finance in a country (or 
sector), one would draw these two dollars from the same donor. Formally, the Herfindahl 









2π  ,             (1) 
                                                     
1 See Steinwand (2015) for a detailed discussion of the relationship between fragmentation and 
coordination. He also introduces the concept of a lead donor, but with a focus on historical ties such as 
by the former colonizer, thereby inducing a specific form of aid (‘private good aid’) with often negative 
consequences for the recipient. 
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where i=1,…,N indicates the different donors, and 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 indicates the share of donor i in overall 
aid finance.2 The Herfindahl index belongs to the larger group of concentration indices, which 
also include concentration ratios (CR). The latter simply add up the shares of a predefined 








=∑ .            (2) 
For an analysis based on CR1—aid by the single largest donor as a percentage of total aid—
see, e.g., Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol (2009: 227). Concentration indices focus on 
the existence of one or a few large donors and indicate high fragmentation when no dominant 
donors exist. As opposed to the Herfindahl index, a shift in proportions among the preselected 
large donors does not alter concentration ratios. However, any change from other donors 
towards these large donors will do so. The first few big donors will be considered in concert. 
This index may therefore be useful if we consider that up to a small number of donors 
additional donors pose no problem, but may be even an advantage. We would then start 
counting fragmentation only when the number of donors exceeds this predefined threshold. 
 
While high concentration has a negative notation in industrial organization, it has a positive 
notation when it comes to development assistance and is simply interpreted as the flipside of 
high fragmentation. This is reflected in the way in which the measure of fragmentation is 
                                                     
2 To stress the relationship with the variance in the volume of aid flows across donors (σ2) the Herfindahl 
index can also be reformulated as: 
N
NHI
12 +⋅= σ . The higher the variance, the higher will be HI; 
for identical donor shares HI=1/N (Kimura, Mori, and Sawada 2012: 2). 
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computed. Based on either of the above measures of concentration, fragmentation indicators 
(F) are computed by subtracting the concentration index from one, i.e., F(HI)=1-HI, or F(CR)=1-
CR. In our empirical analysis below, we include the fragmentation indices based on both HI 
and CR3. The decision to use CR3 rather than, say, CR4 is arbitrary, but since the conceptual 
idea is the same, we restrict the discussion to only one of these indicators.3 
 
Compared to fragmentation measures using concentration indices, measures based on a 
simple count of donors (N) in a given country and year are more straightforward and easier 
to understand. The DAC has widely used the donor count either directly or in its refined form 
which only considers “non-significant” aid relationships (OECD 2009a; Ericsson and Steensen 
2016). While it introduces a binary distinction between large and small donors, it neglects more 
precise information on the donors’ relative shares.  
 
Hence the existence of lead donors remains unconsidered, and the problem is conceived as 
being reflected in the multitude of those donors that want to be part of all discussions and 
decision-making processes without delivering any significant input. To ensure that the efforts 
of small donor countries with correspondingly small aid budgets do not appear as “non-
significant” and hence potentially undesirably everywhere, “significance” is defined by the 
DAC not only as a share of the recipients’ overall aid inflows, but also in relationship to the 
individual donor’s average aid outflows (OECD 2011, pp. 5f.). We ignore the latter part of the 
definition here, as it arguably represents a concession necessary to make the indicator 
                                                     
3The correlations of CR3 with CR2 and CR4 are 0.982 and 0.991, respectively. As a consequence, our 
main results are unchanged when using CR2 or CR4. 
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acceptable within the donor community, and dilutes the conceptual idea of the indicator. To 
determine whether a donor’s contribution is “significant” for the recipient country, the DAC 
considers whether the donor is among the largest donors that cumulatively account for at least 
90% of aid inflows. We denote the remaining number of donors, i.e., the number of donors 
that are not significant according to this definition, as N(<10%). We will refer to this measure 
as the “number of small donors” whereby “small” is defined with respect to aid to a specific 
recipient or sector independently of the total aid budget of the donor agency.  
 
Apart from measures based on concentration ratios and donor counts, some authors have 
suggested the use of inequality measures such as the Theil index (Acharya, Fuzzo de Lima, 
and Moore 2006; Fløgstad and Hagen 2016). The latter has the advantage of being 
decomposable, so that the variance between donors can be compared to the variance within 
donors (e.g., regarding the sectoral spread as in Fløgstad and Hagen 2016). However, like other 
inequality measures such as the coefficient of variation or the Gini coefficient, the Theil index 
does not vary with a change in population size (here the number of donors) as long as all 
proportions remain the same. In terms of inequality, whether two donors provide 50% each or 
ten donors provide 10% each does not matter—in both cases the Theil index or the Gini 
coefficient will be zero because proportions are equal. This is a central characteristic that 
distinguishes inequality measures from measures of concentration (Ray 1998: 184-192), and 
makes inequality measures less suitable for the measurement of fragmentation.  
 
For our analysis, the Herfindahl index and the concentration ratio for a reasonable number of 
key donors, as well as the two measures of donor counts appear to be theoretically plausible. 
However, as already mentioned above, they reflect different types of potential problems as 
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they give different weights to donors at the high end and the low end of the aid distribution. 
The DAC index places greater emphasis to donors at the low end of the distribution. In 
contrast, the Herfindahl index and the CR3 value the existence of a few dominant donors and 
do not (or only marginally) consider the addition of small donors at the tail of the distribution.4 
The latter would be appropriate if, for instance, small donors tended to align themselves more 
easily with existing procedures or even used delegated cooperation, thus adding very little to 
existing transaction costs (Dreher and Michaelowa 2010: 23). The former would be appropriate 
if, even for such small donors, transaction costs for the recipients remain high or at least too 
high in relation to the donors’ small contributions. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
Table 1 about here 
Figure 2 about here 
 
We illustrate these differences between the indicators in Figure 1, which provides maps for the 
most recent period for which data were available (2010-2013). It is noticeable that some 
countries like Brazil or India completely change their positions from the lowest to the highest 
end of the country ranking, depending on the indicator used. Table 1 and Figure 2 provide 
additional descriptive statistics as well as bivariate correlations for each indicator and for the 
                                                     
4 Note that when adding a small donor, the concentration ratio will generally not remain fully 
unchanged, but change to the extent that this small donor reduces the share of the large donors within 
the overall aid flows to the recipient country. It will only remain completely unchanged if new small 
donors just happen to balance out reductions in the flows by other small donors. 
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whole sample period. During the periods observed, the average number of donors in the 
different recipient countries varies between 7.67 and 47 (decimals due to averaging over 4-year 
periods). As expected, the bivariate correlation coefficient between the two indices based on 
concentration measures is rather high (rho=87%), as is the one between the two DAC indices 
N(<10%) and N (rho=94%). The latter indicates that the overall number of donors is largely 
driven by the number of small donors. 
 
The correlation across these two groups of indicators is much smaller, and never exceeds 42%. 
For N(<10%), the correlation is smallest with rho=9% and rho=11% for F(HI) and F(CR3) 
respectively. This implies that a strong dominance of a few big donors can coincide with 
numerous activities of multiple small donors. Whether the activity of small donors as such is 
a problem, or whether it is the lack of dominant lead donors (or neither of the two) hence 
appears to be an important question to be examined. 
 
The key additional information in Figure 2 is the distribution of the data. For the Herfindahl-
based fragmentation index, the distribution appears quite skewed due to outliers with an 
unusually high donor concentration. This is due to some cases with just one or two extremely 
large lead donors since all other indicators including F(CR3) show a much more balanced 
distribution. The other indicators are more normally distributed and exhibit no clear outliers. 
 
Figure 3 finally shows that whatever indicator we choose, we observe a considerable increase 
in fragmentation since the early 1970s. Noticeably, there has not been any reduction after the 




Figure 3 about here 
 
2.3. Different channels for the influence of fragmentation 
Apart from the different contexts and indicators that should have an impact on the results we 
obtain for the effect of fragmentation, the way in which the effect of fragmentation is modelled 
should also be relevant. In the extant literature, two distinct models can be observed. In the 
first case, fragmentation is considered to directly affect the outcome variables, e.g., growth or 
bureaucratic quality (direct channel) (e.g., Knack and Rahman 2006). In the second, 
fragmentation is considered not by itself, but as having a negative effect on the effectiveness 
of aid (moderating channel) (e.g., Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol 2009). While the 
corresponding analysis refers to something rather different, the choice of one of these channels 
over the other has never been discussed in any paper we are aware of. While the distinction 
obviously collapses for developing countries not receiving any aid, it is important in all other 
cases.  
 
Modelling the direct channel supposes that there could be a (negative or positive) effect of 
fragmentation independently of the amount and consequences of aid given. Even if recipients 
wasted all money flowing in the country, or used it only for consumtive purposes, they might 
benefit from the exchange with different donor agencies present in the country. Indeed, some 
recipients seem to make use of the international contacts established in the field of 
development cooperation for other purposes, e.g., in the areas of international trade and 
foreign direct investment, so that there could be an effect on growth independently of the 
amount of aid received (Dreher and Michaelowa 2010: 28-31). Other scholars also report about 
recipient country officials stating a preference for new additional donors, rather than more 
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funding from the existing ones (Tatrallyay and Stadelmann 2011). In these situations, clearly, 
fragmentation in itself is seen as a valuable asset, independently of the amount of aid.  
 
Similar examples can be found for a negative direct effect of fragmentation. This is what Knack 
and Rahman (2006) have in mind in their paper: Independently of the effect of aid itself, their 
model suggests a negative effect of each additional donor on the functioning of local 
bureaucracies. This could happen, for instance, if donors poach key advisors from the 
government or private sector, or if they give conflicting advice. 
 
In contrast, the moderating channel ignores any effects other than through aid. Hence the focus 
is on the effect of aid on diverse outcome variables, and on how this effect is in turn altered by 
donor fragmentation. Econometrically, this leads to the focus on the interaction term between 
aid and fragmentation while the modelling of the direct channel examines the marginal effect 
of fragmentation instead. In our empirical analysis, we will present both perspectives, but 
focus on the moderating channel, which has been more frequently examined in the extant 
literature. 
 
3. The effect of fragmentation on aid outcomes  
After some general information on data and methods, this section presents the empirical 
results for the relationship between fragmentation and the different outcome variables growth, 
bureaucratic quality, and primary enrolment, for both the direct and the moderating channel, 
and for the different contexts discussed above. 
 
3.1. Data and methods 
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As mentioned above, our intention in the econometric part is to provide a maximum of 
comparability with widely accepted existing studies. There is hence no subjective adjustment 
of the original studies in order to obtain a regression specification with better fit (or any other 
reason). With respect to the relationship between aid and growth, we replicate the study by 
Burnside and Dollar (2000), based on the permutations in Clemens et al. (2012). Our 
benchmark regression uses Clemens et al.’s preferred specification—dismissing invalid 
instruments, differencing the regression equation (or, equivalent in expectation, using country 
fixed effects), including period fixed effects, and clustering standard errors at the country level. 
Following Clemens et al., we also lag aid by one period, so that aid can more reasonably be 
expected to cause growth rather than being its effect. Our model hence corresponds to the 
Clemens et al. specification and only adds the fragmentation indicator (equally lagged by one 
period) and its interaction with aid, and data for more recent years.5 With respect to the 
relationship of aid to bureaucratic quality, we base our analysis on Knack and Rahman (2007). 
And finally, with respect to aid effectiveness in the education sector, we follow the analyses 
by Michaelowa and Weber (2007) and Dreher, Thiele, and Nunnenkamp (2008), based on the 
update by Birchler and Michaelowa (2016).  
 
Since the regressions for growth, bureaucratic quality, and education correspond to the 
original specifications of the different authors, they differ with respect to controls, estimation 
                                                     
5 There is one minor difference requested by a referee, namely the omission of Burnside and Dollar’s 
index of economic policy that considerably reduces the available number of observations. Since the 
index is always insignificant, this does not change any of the results. For the exact replication of Clemens 
et al. (2013) including economic policy (and also with respect to the time period covered by them), see 
the discussion paper version of this article (Gehring et al. 2015). 
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methods, and time periods covered, and are thus difficult to compare to each other. As 
suggested by a reviewer, we hence provide additional specifications, in which all data are 
updated to the most recent year available (i.e., until 2013), and all models based on the 
specification by Clemens et al. (2013) outlined above. The tables presented in the main text all 
refer to these specifications with fixed effects, lagged aid, a common set of control variables, 
and coverage of all available years until 2013. The original models are presented in the 
appendix. To reduce clutter, we do not present the coefficients for the control variables, but 
list the variables included in each model with their definitions, descriptive statistics, and 
sources in Table A1 in the appendix.6  
 
For both the aid variable and our computation of the aid fragmentation indices, we use data 
for Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the OECD/DAC’s (2016) Creditor Reporting 
System (CRS). Following the traditions of the aid effectiveness literature, we use 
disbursements rather than commitments because only funds that are disbursed can be 
expected to become effective in terms of development outcomes.  
 
Since not all types of ODA can be expected to have a direct impact on growth, some of the 
regressions in Clemens et al. (2012) are based on what they call “early-impact aid,” in order to 
improve the precision of the estimated effect of aid. As our primary intention is to estimate the 
                                                     
6 Full regression results are available on request. 
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relationship with fragmentation rather than the effect of aid, however, it appears relevant in 
our context to capture aid flows in their entirety.7  
 
There is only one part of aid that we would ideally want to exclude from the computation of 
fragmentation indicators—the part of aid that does not flow to recipient countries such as 
financial support for students and refugees in donor countries, debt relief, and administrative 
costs for donor agencies (see also Mürle 2007). To do so, the OECD (2009a) suggests the use of 
Country Programmable Aid (CPA). However, CPA data are only available for the most recent 
decade, so that their use would have greatly reduced the number of observations for our 
analysis. This problem is aggravated in the present analytical setting as sensible panel 
regressions in models with large fluctuations in the dependent variable (such as growth) and/ 
or very limited change in the explanatory variables (aid disbursements and fractionalization) 
need to combine the information over several years by taking averages. Following the above-
mentioned econometric studies, we therefore accept the lack of precision in the ODA data in 
order to obtain longer time-series. 
 
We do not claim to necessarily estimate causal effects of aid and fragmentation with the 
regressions in this paper. However, readers who are convinced by the identification strategies 
in the existing papers replicated here can confidently interpret the results of our paper as 
                                                     
7 Furthermore, early-impact aid has been shown not to be a robust predictor of growth (Rajan and 
Subramanian 2008; Bjørnskov 2013), and to not differ in effectiveness compared to all aid (Roodman 
2015). A major drawback with this measure is that disaggregated aid disbursements are not available 
for the entire period, so that disbursements have to be estimated based on commitments. Data on 
commitments in the earlier periods also suffer from severe underreporting (see OECD/DAC 2014).  
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causal effects as well. It should also be noted that, even if the main effects of aid and 
fragmentation cannot be interpreted as causal, the endogeneity problem does not need to 
extend to the interaction between these variables. The respective coefficient, which is at the 
center of our interest here, is biased only if the change in the effect of aid that comes about 
through changes in fragmentation is affected by omitted variables or reverse causality (after 
controlling for the main effects and all other variables in the model). The conditions under 
which this is true are different from and somewhat weaker than the assumptions that need to 
hold for the exogeneity of the main effects. The relevant conditions are usually met, in 
particular, when at least one of the two interacted variables is exogenous (for a detailed 
discussion, see Appendix S4 in Dreher, Eichenauer and Gehring 2016).  
 
While most authors consider aid as endogenous, we are not aware of any studies discussing 
potential endogeneity problems of fragmentation. However, one might, for instance, imagine 
that there could be some reverse causality, with growth, bureaucratic quality, and functioning 
education, influencing the number of donors providing aid. To provide a plausibility check 
for this eventuality, Table A2 in the appendix shows the results of a regression of the different 
fragmentation indices on various lags of our three outcome variables. Only three out of 32 
coefficients are significant at conventional levels, indicating no systematic trends. This 
increases our confidence that fragmentation in a specific country and year is not endogenous 




None of the studies in the aid fragmentation literature can claim to avoid any remaining risk 
of endogeneity.8 GMM estimation, which until a few years ago was widely considered as 
providing suitable internal instruments, has now been demonstrated to be no solution to such 
problems. Bazzi and Clemens (2013) point out that testing the power of (internal) instruments 
in GMM-type regressions is as important as in any instrumental variables setting. Still, tests 
for instrument power in GMM-type models are rarely reported, leaving substantial doubts 
about the reliability of these studies’ results. Equally important are the difficulties with respect 
to the exclusion restriction. Using lagged values (in differences or levels) of aid to instrument 
current aid implies the exclusion restriction that past levels of aid affect contemporaneous 
growth exclusively via current aid. Given the various lags involved for aid to potentially affect 
growth this assumption seems as strict as simply assuming that aid affects (or does not affect) 
growth. Similarly, past levels of fragmentation could affect growth as easily as 
contemporaneous fragmentation. For example, high fragmentation when planning a project 
or designing a sector-specific aid strategy can affect growth many years later, even holding 
fragmentation at the later point in time constant. The same problems arise when bureaucratic 
quality or educational enrolment rather than growth are used as dependent variables. 
 
  
                                                     
8 See Dreher and Langlotz (2015), Dreher and Lohmann (2015), and Galiani et al. (2017) for recent 
attempts to identify causal effects of aid on growth (but with no reference to fragmentation).  
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3.2. The effect of aid fragmentation on growth 
Table 2 presents our results for the growth rate of real GDP per capita based on Clemens et al. 
(2012) as described above.9 The interaction term between aid and fragmentation is significant, 
negative, and sizeable for F(HI) and F(CR3) suggesting that the largest possible increase in 
fragmentation from 0 to 1 would reduce the effect of aid on growth by more than half a 
percentage point (columns 2 and 3). Within our sample, the marginal effect of aid at low 
fragmentation (20th percentile) is more than twice as high as for high fragmentation (80th 
percentile). For the other two indicators–N and N(<10%)–these differences are smaller and not 
significant at conventional levels (columns 3 and 4). When reproducing the analysis with a 
further interaction between fragmentation with aid squared (appendix, Table A3) the contrast 
between the two sets of fragmentation indicators becomes even clearer. Arguably, if the 
relationship between aid and growth is conditioned on fragmentation, the whole relationship 
is conditioned, and not merely its linear component. In this more complete specification, 
fragmentation computed on the basis of the two concentration indices shows a similarly 
negative effect on aid effectiveness as before. In contrast, fragmentation as measured by the 
count of donors does not seem to make any difference for aid effectiveness (column 3) or to 
even influence aid effectiveness positively (column 4). In fact, for both of these indicators, aid 
becomes positively significant only at higher levels of fragmentation. Small additional donors 
may adjust and at the same time provide more ideas that are beneficial for aid effectiveness as 
                                                     
9 The regression we build upon is presented by Clemens et al. (2012) in Table 7, column 7. The data are 
updated for the 2006-2013 period using the World Development Indicators and OECD DAC. Note that 
differences as compared to the analysis in our discussion paper (Gehring et al. 2015) are primarily driven 
by the longer time series used here, and the corresponding changes in our sample as well as the greater 
precision of all point estimates. 
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a whole. However, since the effects for N and N(<10%) are far from robust, we should not be 
too quick with any such interpretation. What is clear from both tables is only the difference 
between the two sets of indicators. Substantially, these results suggest that any negative effect 
fragmentation may have, is driven by the lack of lead donors, rather than by the sheer number 
of donors or an exceedingly high number of small donors. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
While we hence find partial evidence for a moderating effect of fragmentation on the effect of 
aid, the direct effect of fragmentation (for aid at the median) is not significant anywhere. This 
confirms the necessity to examine the direct and moderating effects separately, and to 
highlight the differences between them.  
 
On the basis of the specification in Table 2, we further proceed by splitting the sample with 
respect to bureaucratic quality, donor alignment, and the time period covered by the data. In 
each case, the sample is divided at the 50th percentile. Bureaucratic quality is measured based 
on the International Country Risk Guide (PRS Group 2013), while donor alignment is 
measured via the standard deviation of donor ideology on a left to right scale using the chief 
executive party orientation from the database of political institutions (Cruz, Keefer, and 
Scartascini 2016). The latter corresponds to the operationalization used by Dreher, Minasyan, 
and Nunnenkamp (2015) for their comparison of donor and recipient ideology.  
 
Table 3 presents the results. While it restricts the presentation to the coefficients of the most 
relevant variable, namely the interaction term between aid and fragmentation, the coefficients 
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for all variables related to aid and fragmentation are presented in Table A4 in the appendix. 
Furthermore, Table 3 provides the p-value for a Wald test of the equality of means for each of 
the two groups compared. The Wald tests are obtained using Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Estimation (SURE), which allows the error terms of different regressions to be related via a 
joint variance-covariance matrix.  
 
There is clear evidence for the relevance of this differentiation. Only in countries with low 
bureaucratic quality do we observe the previously discussed negative influence of 
fragmentation on aid effectiveness; in this subset of recipient countries, however, the 
interaction terms with F(HI) and F(CR3) are very high. It is thus this subset of countries that 
drives the overall effect reported above.  
 
In contrast, the differentiations with respect to political alignment and time periods do not 
show any consistent patterns. There is hence no statistical support for the expectation that 
ideological closeness between donors or coordination efforts in later years may mitigate the 
problems related to fragmentation.  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Taken together, the evidence examined so far does not reveal any general effect of 
fragmentation. Yet, our results suggest that fragmentation reduces aid effectiveness in 
recipient countries with low levels of administrative capacity. In the latter case, especially the 
lack of strong lead donors appears to be detrimental to growth. In contrast, the number of 




3.3. The effect of aid fragmentation on bureaucratic quality 
To assess whether we find similar results for different outcome variables we next turn to 
bureaucratic quality. As mentioned before, this is the area in which fragmentation is usually 
expected to have the most immediate negative effect. The reason is that the transaction costs 
supposedly induced by fragmentation should primarily hit the overburdened recipient 
country’s bureaucracy in charge of coordinating the different aid inflows and donor demands.  
 
Knack and Rahman’s (2007) influential and widely cited original study focuses on the 
theoretical links between fragmentation and bureaucratic quality while the empirical testing 
is less comprehensive. In a simple cross-sectional analysis they then estimate how average 
donor fragmentation over the 1980s and 1990s relates to bureaucratic quality in 2001.10 While 
the study is known for the evidence it provides on the negative effect of fragmentation, the 
careful reader notices that the authors differentiate, and do not claim such an effect for all 
countries. Indeed they state that for many recipients—those receiving little aid, which are 
typically also the wealthier ones with better administrations—there is little reason to expect a 
detrimental effect of fragmentation (Knack and Rahman 2007: 190). They thereby focus on the 
direct effect of fragmentation and do not analyze the interaction term with aid.  
                                                     
10 Knack and Rahman separately discuss results for aid volumes and project numbers. As discussed in 
Knack and Rahman (2007: 186f.), but also, for instance, in Kilby (2011) and Dreher and Michaelowa 
(2010), measuring project level fragmentation has several advantages, but also disadvantages, notably 
the severely reduced data availability for early years. In line with the discussion of the growth 




When replicating their cross-section results for the full set of recipients while adding an 
interaction term with aid in order to also examine the moderating effect of fragmentation (see 
Table A6 in the appendix),11 we confirm that the general results do not appear robust. While 
the marginal effect of fragmentation is always negative, it is significant only when using the 
total number of donors as the indicator of fragmentation (column 3). Similarly, the interaction 
term is negative throughout, but significant only in the third column. Yet, in Knack and 
Rahman’s cross sectional setting, when fragmentation is very high, the marginal effect of aid 
on bureaucratic quality almost always becomes significantly negative, while this is not the case 
at low levels of fragmentation. This lends some empirical support to the negative effect of 
fragmentation. 
 
However, when adding additional data and adjusting the specification to the model in 
Table 2—thereby transforming the cross-sectional analysis into a fixed effects panel model—
any evidence for such an effect completely disappears (see Table 4). The interaction term is 
never statistically significant and varies in sign. Correspondingly, the marginal effect of aid 
does not depend on the level of fragmentation (in fact, it remains insignificant throughout). 
The direct effect of fragmentation at median aid is even positively significant in one regression 
(column 2) and insignificant otherwise.12  
 
                                                     
11 The replication is based on Knack and Rahman (2007, Table 1, equation 1). 
12 We again reproduced the regressions including an interaction of fragmentation with aid squared (not 
shown). This did not change our results. 
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Tables 4 and 5 about here 
 
The sample split presented in Table 5 does not identify any negative effect of fragmentation 
either.13 Just as for the case of growth, we observe a difference between recipients with 
different levels of administrative capacity, and this difference is significant for both F(HI) and 
F(CR3). However, even for the sub-sample of recipients with low bureaucratic quality, the 
interaction term between aid and fragmentation is never significant at conventional levels.  
 
As before, we find no consistent pattern for the other two differentiations. We obtain a number 
of significant interaction terms for the period prior to 1994 (with values that are significantly 
different from those for the later period), but the signs of the estimators point in opposing 
directions. While we did expect that different fragmentation indicators would show different 
effects, these virtually opposite effects appear rather puzzling. 
 
In summary, while the results based on the initial sample and cross-sectional specification by 
Knack and Rahman (2007) show some—albeit not robust—evidence for a negative effect of 
fragmentation, both directly and in a moderating function through a negative influence of the 
effect of aid, these results do not hold in our panel models. Thus right in the area in which 
                                                     
13 See also Table A5 in the appendix for the presentation of all main effects. For the regressions of 
Table A6, we do not reproduce the sample splits given that the original analysis is at the cross-sectional 
level using country data averaged over almost 20 years. Using such long-term averages to define the 
sub-samples does not appear useful, especially for those recipients that developed significantly over 
time. In addition, sub-samples would become very small since the full sample only includes 83 
observations to begin with. 
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scholars usually expect the most direct negative effect of fragmentation, results are ambiguous 
and difficult to reconcile with theoretical expectations. There is no systematic effect on 
bureaucratic quality, no matter which perspective we adopt to measure fragmentation. 
 
3.4. The effect of aid fragmentation on education 
The education sector is one of the social sectors which were characterized above as typically 
accommodating for a much higher number of donors than other sectors. According to Frot and 
Santiso (2010: 22) the education sector is the most fragmented of all sectors. We are thus 
interested to test what effect fragmentation has on outcomes in this sector, and how it affects 
the relationship between aid and educational outcomes. The first studies investigating the 
effectiveness of education aid were Michaelowa and Weber (2007) and Dreher, Thiele, and 
Nunnenkamp (2008). Both studies find a generally positive relationship between aid and 
primary school enrolment, albeit their interpretation somewhat differs with respect to the size 
and robustness of the effect. In a recent update, Birchler and Michaelowa (2016) confirm these 
results based on the more comprehensive sectoral DAC disbursement data now available. In 
their Table 1, regression 2, Birchler and Michaelowa (2016: 40) use a regression specification of 
aid on education similar to the work of Clemens et al. (2012), and hence most easily comparable 
to the analysis in section 3.2. The dependent variable is the net primary enrolment rate (in %). 
Tables A8-A10 in the appendix are based on the original specification, with data covering the 
1996-2010 period, aggregated to three periods over five years each, only adding the variables 
related to fragmentation. Tables 6 and 7 below present the results with further updated data 
and the specifications in analogy to those in Table 2 for the growth regressions.  
 





The outcomes for this sector are clear: There is no evidence for a negative effect of 
fragmentation. If at all, fragmentation seems to have a positive effect on education. In Table 6, 
the interaction term between education aid and fragmentation is always positive, and 
significant in three out of four regressions. In all four regressions, aid is positively significant 
for high levels of fragmentation, while it is mostly insignificant with a lower point estimate of 
the marginal effect at low levels of fragmentation. It seems that greater donor fragmentation 
hence increases rather than decreases aid effectiveness in the education sector.  
 
There is no evidence for a direct effect of fragmentation on educational enrolment either. 
Fragmentation at median aid is mostly insignificant, and in one case even positively 
significant. Clearly, this evidence points towards a positive, rather than a negative effect of 
fragmentation.14  
 
A skeptical reader might argue that the positive results for fragmentation could be an artifact 
of a potentially misspecified regression (using the set-up and the variables of the Burnside- 
Dollar model for education). However, the corresponding Table A8 in the appendix, which is 
based on the original specification, points in the same direction, although less strikingly so. 
                                                     
14 Following the advice of a reviewer, we also tested whether our results are robust to replacing aid 
disbursements with commitments. Based on the specification of Table 6, Table A11 in the appendix 
shows substantially the same results. Note that we again also reproduced the regressions including an 




Table 7 shows the break down by bureaucratic quality and donor alignment. (The split into 
the period before and after 1994 is not possible due to limited data availability for education 
aid and the correspondingly shorter overall time series.) Once more, the sample split confirms 
the relevance of bureaucratic quality. For three out of our four fragmentation indicators, the 
interaction term is significantly lower in the sub-sample of recipients with poor administrative 
capacity. While fragmentation appears to be rather positive for the education sector overall, 
this effect is driven by those countries with better bureaucratic quality. In the comparison 
group, the interaction term is always insignificant. As opposed to bureaucratic quality, 
political alignment between donors does not seem to have any relevant effect.  
 
Table 7 about here 
 
As before, Table 7 is reproduced in the appendix with some more information regarding the 
coefficients of the other relevant variables (Table A7). The appendix also shows a replication 
of the sample split based on the original data (Tables A9 and A10). The main message is that 
there is no evidence for a negative effect of fragmentation in the education sector, whatever 
the sample split and the fragmentation indicator selected. 
 
This suggests that education may indeed be a field where neither the lack of lead donors, nor 
the overall number of donors negatively affect outcomes—possibly because there is enough 
experience with high donor numbers in the sector (which also include multiple NGOs not even 
included in the discussion here), and hence the government authorities may have grown used 
to take over a stronger leadership position in this sector than elsewhere. The relevant 
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coordinating framework may be in place. In this case, more donors can simply add new ideas 
with positive rather than negative consequences for educational outcomes.  
 
Overall, these results support our earlier skeptical and cautious conclusions: There is no 
systematic pattern that supports a generally negative effect of fragmentation, and the results 
differ depending on the sector, the specific country context, the choice of the respective 
indicator, and on whether we consider the direct or the moderating channel. Generally, the 
moderating channel seems to dominate, i.e., there is little evidence for any direct effects, but 
there is some evidence for a conditioning effect of fragmentation on aid effectiveness. This 
effect is significantly negative when we look at economic growth, but only when conceiving 
fragmentation primarily as a lack of lead donors. Noticeably, the negative relationship does 
not hold for recipients above a certain level of administrative capacity.  
 
The effect of fragmentation is largely insignificant when looking at bureaucratic quality rather 
than growth. No systematic pattern can be observed apart from the fact that again, initial 
administrative capacity seems to play some role.  
 
In the education sector, we tend to observe a positive rather than a negative relationship 
between fragmentation and aid effectiveness, independently of the indicator used. The general 
features of this sector are very different from other sectors such as economic infrastructure or 
administrative capacity building, and this apparently finds its reflection in a greater capacity 
of recipient countries to deal with fragmented donor structures in an appropriate way. As 
before, initial bureaucratic quality is important, however: The positive effect of fragmentation 




In sum, this implies that with the evidence currently available generalizing statements on the 
negative effect of fragmentation appear problematic. We need greater differentiation and a 
more detailed analysis before we can safely draw firm conclusions. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper set out to question the apparent consensus that fragmented aid is generally “bad” 
aid. Our systematic and detailed reexamination of the literature shows that theoretically, we 
should expect differences related to (i) the different concepts of fragmentation when using 
different indicators, (ii) the different recipient country contexts, (iii) the different outcomes 
under consideration, and (iv) the channels considered for fragmentation to affect these 
outcomes (directly or via reduced aid effectiveness). The relevance of this differentiation finds 
clear support in our empirical analysis.  
 
At the example of the education sector, we show that a reduction of fragmentation (i.e., a 
decrease in donor numbers or an increase in donor concentration) can have a negative effect. 
We conjecture that education is an area in which recipient governments have anyway acquired 
long-term experience in coordinating multiple interventions that include a large number of 
actors—even beyond the bi- and multilateral donors considered here.  
 
The evidence in the education sector contrasts with the evidence in other areas: Our evidence 
on economic growth largely confirms the standard expectations of a negative effect of 
fragmentation on aid effectiveness. However, we find significant effects only when we 
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conceptualize fragmentation as a lack of concentration (no lead donors). Regarding 
bureaucratic quality, we do not find any systematic effect of donor fragmentation. 
 
In all these cases, initial administrative capacity matters. The effect of fragmentation on aid 
effectiveness is generally less positive (or more negative) for recipient countries with low 
bureaucratic quality. The positive effects of fragmentation that we observe (i.e., with respect 
to education) are driven by the subset of recipients with high bureaucratic quality, while 
negative effects (i.e., with respect to growth) are driven by the subset of recipients with low 
bureaucratic quality. In the respective comparison group, the effect of fragmentation is 
generally insignificant. 
 
Overall, we conclude that the generally expected negative effect of fragmentation is less robust 
than commonly assumed. Given the theoretically relevant differentiations outlined above, this 
should not come as a surprise. In any case, the differences we observe and the lack of a 
systematic overall pattern should lead us to a more cautious interpretation of the available 
evidence. Based on the evidence presented in this paper, any generalizing judgements about 
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Figure 1: Fragmentation of ODA according to four indicators (2010-2013) 
 
High Rel. high Medium
Rel. low Low No data
F(HI)
High Rel. high Medium
Rel. low Low No data
F(CR3)
High Rel. high Medium
Rel. low Low No data
Total Number of Donors (N)
High Rel. high Medium




Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based on aid by the three largest donors as a percentage of total aid; Small donors 
(N<10%): Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid inflows. Each of the five categories corresponds to a quintile of the 
distribution for the respective indicator. Data include all 122 countries for which information on donors is available (indicators averaged over the four-year period).  
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Figure 2: Violin plots of fragmentation indices 
  
Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based 
on aid by the three largest donors as a percentage of total aid; N(<10%): Fragmentation index based on 
the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid inflows. The violin plots combine 
a box-plot diagram and a density trace. The white dot indicates the median value, the shaded area the 
density and the black bar shows the range that contains 50% of the observations (from the 25th to the 
75th percentile). The black line ends at 1.5 times this range above and below this interval. Points beyond 









































































Figure 3: Fragmentation trends over time (1974-2013) 
  
Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based 
on aid by the three largest donors as a percentage of total aid; N: Total number of donors; N(<10%): 
Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid 


























































Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the fragmentation indicators 
       Correlation coefficients 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max F(HI) F(CR3) N N(<10%) 
F(HI) 715 0.75 0.15 0.11 0.93 1    
F(CR3) 715 0.34 0.14 0.00 0.67 0.87 1   
N 715 29.60 9.15 7.67 47.00 0.37 0.42 1  
N(<10%) 715 20.81 7.73 4.33 41.75 0.09 0.11 0.94 1 
 
Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based 
on aid by the three largest donors as a percentage of total aid; N: Total number of donors; N(<10%): 
Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid 
inflows. Sample and fragmentation data as in Table 2 based on the extended Burnside-Dollar data 




Table 2: Aid, fragmentation and growth (based on Burnside and Dollar), 1974-2013 
Fragmentation index F(HI) F(CR3) 
Total number  
of donors (N) 
Small donors  
(N<10%) 
Dependent variable: GDP p.c. growth 
Aid 
0.542** 0.354** 0.229 0.174 
[0.265] [0.140] [0.140] [0.122] 
Aid^2 
0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Fragmentation 
-0.124 -0.042 -0.071 0.000 
[1.656] [1.877] [0.063] [0.057] 
Aid x Fragmentation 
-0.527* -0.525** -0.004 -0.003 
[0.285] [0.209] [0.004] [0.005] 
Adj. R-Squared 0.260 0.260 0.250 0.240 
Number of observations 715 715 715 715 
Number of countries 78 78 78 78 
Marginal effect of Aid at     
Frag. 20th percentile 0.215** 0.261** 0.164** 0.144* 
 [0.098] [0.105] [0.081] [0.077] 
Frag. 50th percentile 0.136** 0.189** 0.144** 0.134** 
 [0.064] [0.079] [0.065] [0.064] 
Frag. 80th percentile 0.092* 0.108** 0.111** 0.115** 
 [0.054] [0.054] [0.052] [0.054] 
Marginal effect of Frag. at -1.280 -1.195 -0.078 -0.006 
Aid 50th percentile [1.315] [1.775] [0.064] [0.059] 
 
Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based on aid by the three largest donors as a percentage of total 
aid; N(<10%): Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid inflows. The control variables are defined in 
the appendix, Table A1. The sample is based on 4-year periods. Both aid and fragmentation are lagged by one period. All regressions include period- and country-
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fixed effects, and use the Anderson-Hsiao correction for initial GDP per capita to adjust for the Nickell bias (Anderson and Hsiao 1982). The marginal effect of aid 
refers to the change in growth for a one percentage point increase in aid as a percentage of GDP at different levels of fragmentation (“Frag.”) and average aid 




Table 3: Aid, fragmentation and growth (based on Burnside and Dollar), 1974-2013, sample splits 








Prior to 1994 Since 1994 
Dependent variable: GDP p.c. growth      
Aid x F(HI) -0.074 -2.248* -0.851** -0.442 -0.131 -1.084 
 [0.389] [1.267] [0.392] [0.356] [0.444] [0.746] 
p-value equal coefficients   0.051   0.375   0.197 
Aid x F(CR3) -0.208 -1.442* -0.422 -0.591** -0.274 -0.656 
 [0.492] [0.768] [0.358] [0.288] [0.392] [0.533] 
p-value equal coefficients   0.114   0.660   0.527 
Aid x Total number of donors (N) -0.011 -0.010* 0.005 -0.012 -0.023 -0.006 
 [0.008] [0.005] [0.003] [0.011] [0.020] [0.006] 
p-value equal coefficients   0.895   0.065   0.341 
Aid x Small donors (N<10%) -0.015 -0.007 0.005* -0.002 -0.022 -0.005 
 [0.011] [0.005] [0.003] [0.015] [0.021] [0.005] 
p-value equal coefficients   0.440   0.578   0.352 
 
Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based on aid by the three largest donors as a percentage of total 
aid; N(<10%): Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid inflows. The regressions are based on Table 2. 
Samples are split at the 50th percentile. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. P-values refer to a Wald test of the equality of 





Table 4: Aid, fragmentation and bureaucratic quality, 1986-2013 
Fragmentation index F(HI) F(CR3) 
Total number 
of donors (N) 
Small donors 
(N<10%) 
Dependent variable: ICRG bureaucratic quality 
Aid -0.022 0.009 -0.006 -0.005 
 [0.067] [0.028] [0.021] [0.019] 
Aid^2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Fragmentation 1.041 1.027* -0.004 -0.011 
 [0.672] [0.609] [0.014] [0.016] 
Aid x Fragmentation 0.026 -0.025 0.000 0.000 
 [0.082] [0.043] [0.001] [0.001] 
Adj. R-Squared 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 
Number of observations 485 485 485 485 
Number of countries 78 78 78 78 
Marginal effect of Aid at     
Frag. 20th percentile -0.003 0.004 -0.007 -0.005 
 [0.021] [0.022] [0.020] [0.020] 
Frag. 50th percentile 0.000 0.001 -0.007 -0.005 
 [0.019] [0.020] [0.021] [0.021] 
Frag. 80th percentile 0.002 -0.003 -0.008 -0.006 
 [0.021] [0.020] [0.024] [0.025] 
Marginal effect of Frag. at 1.099 1.019* -0.012 -0.015 
Aid 50th percentile [0.684] [0.602] [0.019] [0.018] 
 
Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based on aid by the three largest donors as a percentage of total 
aid; N(<10%): Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid inflows. The control variables are defined in 
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the appendix, Table A1. The sample is based on 4-year periods. Both aid and fragmentation are lagged by one period. All regressions include period- and country-
fixed effects and instrument initial GDP per capita with its first lag. The marginal effect of aid refers to the change in bureaucratic quality if aid per GDP increases 
by one percentage point at different levels of fragmentation (“Frag.”) and average aid values. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. 




Table 5: Aid, fragmentation and bureaucratic quality, 1986-2013, sample splits 








Prior to 1994 Since 1994 
Dependent variable: ICRG bureaucratic quality       
Aid x F(HI) 0.341 -0.101 -0.143 0.061 0.253* -0.050 
 [0.215] [0.095] [0.158] [0.131] [0.134] [0.063] 
p-value equal coefficients                 0.015  0.183  0.007 
Aid x F(CR3) 0.451** -0.072 -0.166* 0.017 0.198** -0.055 
 [0.203] [0.076] [0.097] [0.089] [0.078] [0.048] 
p-value equal coefficients                 0.002  0.077  0.000 
Aid x Total number of donors (N) 0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.001] [0.005] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004] 
p-value equal coefficients                 0.171  0.959  0.412 
Aid x Small donors (N<10%) 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.007* 0.000 
 [0.006] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.004] [0.001] 
p-value equal coefficients                 0.826  0.807  0.014 
 
Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based on aid by the three largest donors as a percentage of total 
aid; N(<10%): Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid inflows. The regressions are based on the 
specifications in Table 4. The samples are split at the 50th percentile, except for the period split that uses the same cut-off year as in Table 3 to facilitate comparison. 
Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. P-values refer to a Wald test of the equality of coefficients for split samples.  




Table 6: Aid, fragmentation and primary enrolment, 1994-2013 
Fragmentation index F(HI) F(CR3) 
Total number  
of donors (N) 
Small donors  
(N<10%) 
Dependent variable: Net enrolment rate (%)  
Aid 1.108 2.062*** 1.149** 0.744 
 [0.720] [0.626] [0.558] [1.096] 
Aid^2 -0.158*** -0.141*** -0.154*** -0.175*** 
 [0.042] [0.042] [0.038] [0.043] 
Fragmentation 0.791 23.849 1.230** -8.489 
 [4.524] [15.797] [0.515] [5.398] 
Aid x Fragmentation 2.843** 1.946 0.097** 2.884* 
 [1.185] [2.163] [0.046] [1.554] 
Adj. R-Squared 0.473 0.515 0.572 0.463 
Number of observations 208 208 208 208 
Number of countries 69 69 69 69 
Marginal effect of Aid at     
Frag. 20% perc. 0.863 1.481** 0.707 0.503 
 [0.695] [0.618] [0.565] [1.114] 
Frag. 50% perc. 1.720*** 1.544** 0.998* 1.484** 
 [0.611] [0.600] [0.511] [0.705] 
Frag. 80% perc. 2.360*** 1.817*** 1.651*** 2.228*** 
 [0.740] [0.658] [0.583] [0.710] 
Marginal effect of Frag. at 3.446 25.666 1.321** -5.795 
Aid 50th percentile [5.284] [17.736] [0.612] [6.220] 
 
Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based on education aid by the three largest donors as a percentage 
of total education aid; N(<10%): Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid inflows. The control variables 
are defined in the appendix, Table A1. The sample is based on 4-year periods. Both aid and fragmentation are lagged by one period. All regressions include period- 
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and country-fixed effects and instrument initial GDP per capita with its first lag. The marginal effect of aid refers to the change in the net enrolment rate if aid per 
capita increases by one percentage point at different levels of fragmentation (“Frag.”) and average aid values. Standard errors clustered at the country level are 




Table 7: Aid, fragmentation and primary enrolment, 1994-2013, sample splits 
 High Bureaucratic Quality Low Bureaucratic Quality High Political Alignment Low Political Alignment 
Dependent variable: Net enrolment rate (%)    
Aid x F(HI) 12.446*** 2.515 1.724 1.594 
 
p-value equal coefficients 
[3.508] [2.036] [2.136] [3.009] 
  0.000   0.953 
Aid x F(CR3) 23.729*** 0.154 2.363 -2.933 
 
p-value equal coefficients 
[3.810] [3.020] [3.068] [12.599] 
  0.000   0.538 
Aid x Total number of donors (N) 0.412 0.017 0.078 -0.028 
 
p-value equal coefficients 
[0.307] [0.076] [0.056] [0.277] 
  0.011   0.567 
Aid x Small donors (N<10%) 12.223 2.158 1.734 0.106 
 [14.025] [3.437] [3.288] [1.530] 
p-value equal coefficients   0.158   0.503 
 
F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based on aid by the three largest donors as a percentage of total aid; 
N(<10%): Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid inflows. The regressions are based on the 
specifications in Table 6. Samples are split at the 50th percentile. The split with respect to period was not possible given that data are available only from 1994. P-





Online Appendix (NOT FOR PUBLICATION) 
 
Table A1: Definition of variables and descriptive statistics 
Burnside & Dollar (Table 2 and 3) 
Variable name Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Definition Sources 
GDP p.c. growth 715 1.79 3.62 -32.42 17.05 
Average over annual growth rates of real GDP p.c. based on 
constant local currency (in %). 
World Bank (2007, 2016)* 
Net ODA (% of 
GDP) 
715 5.31 8.17 -0.13 82.39 
ODA total net in % of GDP (high maximum value is Liberia 
over the 2006-2009 period). 
OECD/DAC (2016) 
F(HI) 715 0.75 0.15 0.11 0.93 
Fragmentation index based on Herfindahl index for 
disbursements, calculated only for donor countries (1- 
Herfindahl). 
OECD/DAC (2016) 
F(CR3) 715 0.34 0.14 0.00 0.67 
Fragmentation index based on concentration ratio of 
disbursements for the 3 largest donors = 1- sum of the share 
of largest three donors. 
OECD/DAC (2016) 
Total number of 
donors (N) 
715 29.60 9.15 7.67 47.00 Total number of donors (N) (bi- and multilateral). OECD/DAC (2016) 
Small donors 
(N<10%) 
715 20.81 7.73 4.33 41.75 
Number of insignificant donors; includes all donors that are 
among the smallest donors and cumulatively account for less 
than 10% of aid (based on the OECD definition). 
OECD/DAC (2016) 
Bureaucratic quality 547 1.77 0.94 0.00 4.00 
Bureaucracy quality indicator, higher scores indicate better 
quality (only used to split samples in Table 3). 





715 2.10 0.12 1.65 2.42 Logarithm of initial GDP p.c. in international prices. 
Heston, Summers, and Aten 
(2006), World Bank (2016)* 
Assassinations 715 0.33 1.04 0.00 11.50 Number of assassinations. Banks and Wilson (2007, 2014)* 
Ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization 
715 0.46 0.30 0.00 0.93 Ethnolinguistic fractionalization. 





715 0.12 0.45 0.00 7.36 
Interaction between assassinations and ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization. 
Banks (2007, 2014), Easterly and 
Levine (1997), Roeder (2001)* 
M2 (% of GDP) 715 9.54 24.61 0.04 243.64 Money and quasi-money (M2) in % of GDP. World Bank (2007, 2016)* 
 
* Data source is Clemens et al. (2012), http://www.cgdev.org/doc/Working%20Papers/CRBB-Replication-Files.zip, accessed 06.06.2012. More details are provided 
in “Technical appendix to counting chickens when they hatch: Timing and the effects of aid on growth,” 
http://www.cgdev.org/doc/Working%20Papers/counting_chickens_technical_appendix.pdf, accessed 06.06.2012. For more recent years, we use data from the 




Knack & Rahman (Table 4 and 5) 
Variable name Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Definition Sources 
Bureaucratic 
quality 
485 1.76 0.95 0.00 4.00 
Bureaucracy quality indicator, higher scores indicate better 
quality; value for the year following the four-year period 
covered by the right-hand side variables. 
PRS Group (2013) 
Net ODA (% of 
GDP) 
485 5.92 9.28 -0.13 82.39 ODA total net in % of GDP.  OECD/DAC (2016) 
F(HI) 485 0.78 0.14 0.11 0.93 
Fragmentation index based on Herfindahl index for 
disbursements, calculated only for donor countries (1- 
Herfindahl). 
OECD/DAC (2016) 
F(CR3) 485 0.37 0.14 0.01 0.67 
Fragmentation index based on concentration ratio of 
disbursements for the 3 largest donors = 1- Sum of the share of 
largest three donors. 
OECD/DAC (2016) 
Total number of 
donors (N) 
485 33.72 7.90 7.67 47.00 Total number of donors (N) (bi- and multilateral). OECD/DAC (2016) 
Small donors 
(N<10%) 
485 24.08 7.07 4.33 41.75 
Number of insignificant donors; includes all donors that are 
among the smallest donors and cumulatively account for less 




1.78 0.91 0.00 4.00 1.78 
Bureaucracy quality indicator, higher scores indicate better 
quality (only used to split samples in Table 5). 
PRS Group (2013)  
Log initial 
GDP/capita 
2.10 0.12 1.65 2.34 2.10 Logarithm of initial GDP p.c. in International prices. 
Heston, Summers, and 
Aten (2006), World Bank 
(2016)* 
Assassinations 0.32 0.95 0.00 11.50 0.32 Number of assassinations. Banks (2007, 2012)* 
Ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization 
0.46 0.30 0.00 0.93 0.46 Ethnolinguistic fractionalization. 







0.11 0.33 0.00 3.04 0.11 
Interaction between assassinations and ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization. 
Banks (2007, 2014), Easterly 
and Levine (1997), Roeder 
(2001)* 
M2 (% of GDP) 13.95 28.87 0.04 243.64 13.95 Money and quasi-money (M2) in % of GDP. World Bank (2007, 2016)* 
 
* Data source is Clemens et al. (2012), http://www.cgdev.org/doc/Working%20Papers/CRBB-Replication-Files.zip, accessed 06.06.2012. More details are provided 
in “Technical appendix to counting chickens when they hatch: Timing and the effects of aid on growth,” 
http://www.cgdev.org/doc/Working%20Papers/counting_chickens_technical_appendix.pdf, accessed 06.06.2012. For more recent years, we use data from the 




Birchler & Michaelowa (Tables 6 and 7)  
Variable name Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Definition Sources 
Net primary 
enrolment rate (%) 
228 81.51 18.37 22.39 100.00 Net enrolment rate for primary education (%).  
WDI (World Bank 2007, 
2016)* 
Aid for education 228 3.23 4.12 0.00 23.33 
ODA per capita allocated to education (disbursement, constant 
2000 US$ million). 
OECD/DAC (2016) 
F(HI) 228 0.50 0.27 0.00 0.89 
Fragmentation index based on Herfindahl Index for 
disbursements, calculated only for donor countries (1- 
Herfindahl). 
OECD/DAC (2016) 
F(CR3) 228 0.14 0.13 0.00 0.52 
Fragmentation index based on concentration ratio of 
disbursements for the 3 largest donors = 1- Sum of the share of 
largest three donors. 
OECD/DAC (2016) 
Total number of 
donors (N) 
228 9.84 6.87 1.00 26.00 Total number of donors (N) (bi- and multilateral). OECD/DAC (2016) 
Small donors 
(N<10%) 
228 0.58 0.29 0.00 0.92 
Number of insignificant donors; includes all donors that are 
among the smallest donors and cumulatively account for less 




228 1.77 0.78 0.00 3.55 
Bureaucracy quality indicator, higher scores indicate better 
quality (only used to split samples in Table 7). 
PRS Group (2013) 
Log initial 
GDP/capita 
228 2.08 0.11 1.65 2.27 Logarithm of initial GDP p.c. in international prices. 
Heston, Summers, and Aten 
(2006), World Bank (2016)* 





228 0.47 0.29 0.00 0.93 Ethnolinguistic fractionalization. 





228 0.13 0.34 0.00 3.04 
Interaction between assassinations and ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization. 
Banks (2012, 2007), Easterly 
and Levine (1997), Roeder 
(2001)* 
M2 (% of GDP) 228 12.03 27.03 0.05 239.67 Money and quasi-money (M2) in % of GDP. World Bank (2007, 2016)* 
 
* Data source is Clemens et al. (2012), http://www.cgdev.org/doc/Working%20Papers/CRBB-Replication-Files.zip, accessed 06.06.2012. More details are provided 
in “Technical appendix to counting chickens when they hatch: Timing and the effects of aid on growth,” 
http://www.cgdev.org/doc/Working%20Papers/counting_chickens_technical_appendix.pdf, accessed 06.06.2012. For more recent years, we use data from the 





Knack & Rahman (Table A6) 
Variable name Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Definition Sources 
Bureaucratic 
quality 
83 2 1 0 4 
Bureaucratic quality indicator, higher scores indicate better 
quality; value in 2001. 
PRS Group (2013) 
F(HI) 83 0.76 0.14 0.30 0.91 
Fragmentation index based on Herfindahl Index for 
disbursements, calculated only for donor countries (1- 
Herfindahl). 
OECD/DAC (2016) 
F(CR3) 83 0.36 0.14 0.08 0.61 
Fragmentation index based on concentration ratio of 
disbursements for the 3 largest donors = 1- Sum of the share of 
largest three donors. 
OECD/DAC (2016) 
Total number of 
donors (N) 
83 27.58 2.41 20.90 31.05 Total number of donors (N) (bi- and multilateral). OECD/DAC (2016) 
Small donors 
(N<10%) 
83 18.55 2.39 13.42 25.85 
Number of insignificant donors; includes all donors that are 
among the smallest donors and cumulatively account for less 




83 2.26 1.21 0.00 6.00 
Bureaucratic quality indicator, higher scores indicate better 
quality; value in 1982. 
PRS Group (2013)* 
Population change/ 
initial population 
83 1.89 1.07 -0.80 3.98 Change in population divided by initial population. World Bank (2004)* 
GDP p.c. change/ 
Initial GDP p.c. 
83 1.16 2.22 -4.54 8.69 Change in GDP p.c. divided by initial GDP. World Bank (2004)* 
No. of years 
covered 
83 15.88 4.99 3.00 19.00 
Number of years covered by the cross-section (varies by 
recipient since not all countries were covered by ICRG over the 
whole period of the cross sectional analysis). 
PRS Group (2013)*  
Aid/GNI 83 7.11 9.00 0.05 50.56 Aid flows as percentage of gross national income (GNI). World Bank (2004)* 




Birchler & Michaelowa (Tables A8 and A9) 
Variable name Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Definition Sources 
Net primary 
enrolment rate (%) 
166 81.86 16.25 27.04 100.00 Net enrolment rate for primary education (%).  World Bank (2012)* 
Aid for education 166 51.78 73.35 0.09 494.18 
Aid allocated to education (disbursement, constant 2000 
US$ million). [Birchler and Michaelowa (2016) mistakenly 
identify this variable as “Education aid per capita,” but have in 
fact not used per capita data.]  
OECD/DAC (2012)* 
F(HI) 166 0.57 0.21 0.03 0.90 
Fragmentation index based on Herfindahl Index for 
disbursements, calculated only for donor countries (1- 
Herfindahl). 
OECD/DAC (2016) 
F(CR3) 166 0.15 0.13 -0.29 0.54 
Fragmentation index based on concentration ratio of 
disbursements for the 3 largest donors = 1- Sum of the share of 
largest three donors. 
OECD/DAC (2016) 
Total number of 
donors (N) 
166 10.40 6.06 1.20 25.20 Total number of donors (N) (bi- and multilateral). OECD/DAC (2016) 
Small donors 
(N<10%) 
166 6.29 4.35 0.00 17.00 
 Number of insignificant donors; includes all donors that are 
among the smallest donors and cumulatively account for less 




166 1.65 0.83 0.00 3.92 
Initial bureaucracy quality indicator, higher scores indicate 
better quality (only used to split samples in Table A9). 
PRS Group (2013)  





166 16.62 4.13 6.35 32.78 Public spending on education (% of government expenditure). World Bank (2012)* 
PTR 166 34.77 13.48 11.14 79.98 Pupil-teacher ratio in primary education. World Bank (2012)* 
Young population 166 37.59 7.92 14.80 49.64 Population aged 0-14 (% of total population). World Bank (2012)* 
GDP per capita 166 4485.21 4712.06 239.07 23362.07 GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$).  World Bank (2012)* 
Budget (surplus) 166 -1.46 4.23 -18.40 35.14 Cash surplus/deficit (% of GDP). World Bank (2012)* 
Inflation 166 19.17 81.97 -4.07 1008.95 Inflation (consumer prices, % annual). World Bank (2012)* 
Openness 166 75.14 35.77 22.36 206.43 Openness (export+import in % of GDP). World Bank (2012)* 
Freedom 166 4.04 1.57 1.00 7.00 
Freedom House (mean of political rights and civil liberties; 
lowest freedom=7, highest=1). 
Freedom House (2011)* 
 
* Data source is Birchler and Michaelowa (2016).  
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Table A2: Pre-trends in fragmentation 
 F(HI) F(CR3) Total number of donors (N) Small donors (N<10%) 
Dependent variable: Fragmentation index (t) 
GDP p.c. growth (t) 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.033 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.048] [0.040] 
GDP p.c. growth (t-1) 0.002* 0.001 0.042 0.011 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.031] [0.034] 
GDP p.c. growth (t-2) 0.001 0.001 0.041 0.027 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.029] [0.030] 
Adj. R-Squared 0.098 0.153 0.918 0.880 
Number of observations 653 653 653 653 
Dependent variable: Fragmentation index (t) 
Bureaucratic quality (t) 0.018 0.014 -0.209 -0.535 
 [0.016] [0.013] [0.269] [0.348] 
Bureaucratic quality (t-1) -0.008 -0.005 -0.258 0.109 
 [0.010] [0.011] [0.295] [0.435] 
Bureaucratic quality (t-2) 0.008 0.005 -0.003 -0.204 
 [0.011] [0.012] [0.296] [0.381] 
Adj. R-Squared 0.044 0.045 0.888 0.842 
Number of observations 418 418 418 418 
Dependent variable: Fragmentation index (t) 
Primary enrolment (t) -0.002 0.002 0.111** 0.003 
 [0.003] [0.002] [0.043] [0.003] 
Primary enrolment (t-1) 0.001 -0.002 -0.064* -0.002 
 [0.003] [0.002] [0.036] [0.003] 
Primary enrolment (t-2) -0.004 -0.002 -0.025 0.005** 
 [0.003] [0.002] [0.057] [0.002] 
Adj. R-Squared 0.760 0.660 0.930 0.880 
Number of observations 165 165 165 165 
 
Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based on aid by the three largest donors as a percentage of total 
aid; N(<10%): Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid inflows. The table examines whether lagged 
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values of (1) growth, (2) bureaucratic quality, and (3) enrolment influence the choice of donors to select recipient countries. Control variables for each regression 
are as in Table 2. The sample is based on 4-year periods. All regressions include period- and country-fixed effects and instrument initial GDP per capita with its 
first lag. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.   
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Table A3: Aid, fragmentation and growth (based on Burnside and Dollar), 1974-2013, with squared interaction 
Fragmentation index F(HI) F(CR3) 
Total number  
of donors (N) 
Small donors  
(N<10%) 
GDP p.c. growth  
Aid 0.223 0.19 0.074 0.024 
[0.466] [0.172] [0.172] [0.150] 
Aid^2 0.015 0.006 0.004 0.004 
[0.019] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] 
Fragmentation -0.977 -1.191 -0.082 -0.013 
[2.182] [2.255] [0.060] [0.054] 
Aid x Fragmentation -0.132 -0.112 0.001 0.004 
[0.573] [0.395] [0.005] [0.006] 
Aid^2 x Fragmentation -0.017 -0.013 0.000 0.000 
[0.023] [0.013] [0.000] [0.000] 
Adj. R-Squared 0.260 0.270 0.250 0.250 
Number of observations 715 715 715 715 
Number of countries 78 78 78 78 
Marginal effect of Aid at     
Frag. 20th percentile 0.181* 0.207** 0.117 0.097 
 [0.098] [0.098] [0.076] [0.071] 
Frag. 50th percentile 0.133** 0.172** 0.115* 0.108* 
 [0.062] [0.072] [0.062] [0.061] 
Frag. 80th percentile 0.106* 0.132** 0.114** 0.126** 
 [0.062] [0.066] [0.053] [0.058] 
Marginal effect of Frag. at -1.411 -1.278 -0.014 0.031 
Aid 50th percentile [1.350] [1.800] [0.053] [0.053] 
 
Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based on aid by the three largest donors as a percentage of total 
aid; N(<10%): Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid inflows. Besides the squared interaction term, 
the regressions are identical to those in Table 2. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Table A4: Aid, fragmentation and growth (based on Burnside and Dollar), 1974-2013, sample splits (all main effects) 
 High Bureaucratic 
Quality 
Low Bureaucratic Quality High Political Alignment Low Political 
Alignment 
Prior to 1994 Since 1994 
GDP p.c. growth 
F(HI) 
Aid 0.543 2.237* 0.859** 0.463 0.313 1.011 
 [0.507] [1.251] [0.363] [0.331] [0.445] [0.728] 
Aid^2 -0.017* -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.005 0.000 
 [0.010] [0.003] [0.001] [0.002] [0.004] [0.002] 
F(HI) -2.734 13.903 0.861 -0.445 -3.300 2.875 
 [2.750] [9.009] [2.527] [2.331] [3.193] [3.083] 
Aid x F(HI) -0.074 -2.248* -0.851** -0.442 -0.131 -1.084 
 [0.389] [1.267] [0.392] [0.356] [0.444] [0.746] 
p-value equal coefficients                 0.051   0.375   0.197 
F(CR3) 
Aid 0.589 1.067* 0.349 0.364** 0.33 0.434 
 [0.403] [0.583] [0.214] [0.182] [0.257] [0.385] 
Aid^2 -0.019* -0.003 0 0 -0.004 -0.001 
 [0.010] [0.004] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.002] 
F(CR3) -2.76 8.774 0.38 0.724 -3.836 3.578 
 [3.985] [7.971] [2.696] [3.313] [4.090] [2.889] 
Aid x F(CR3) -0.208 -1.442* -0.422 -0.591** -0.274 -0.656 
 [0.492] [0.768] [0.358] [0.288] [0.392] [0.533] 





Table A4 (continued) 
 








Prior to 1994 Since 1994 
Total Number of Donors (N) 
Aid 0.746** 0.610 0.052 0.460 0.836 0.260 
 [0.367] [0.385] [0.128] [0.349] [0.557] [0.240] 
Aid^2 -0.016* 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 0.000 
 [0.010] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.004] [0.002] 
Total Number of Donors 
(N) 
-0.054 0.480 -0.178 -0.032 -0.159 0.120** 
[0.102] [0.345] [0.118] [0.109] [0.154] [0.050] 
Aid x Total Number of 
Donors (N) 
-0.011 -0.010* 0.005 -0.012 -0.023 -0.006 
[0.008] [0.005] [0.003] [0.011] [0.020] [0.006] 
p-value equal coefficients                0.895   0.065   0.341 
Small Donors (N<10%) 
Aid 0.706** 0.448 0.078 0.174 0.617 0.178 
 [0.340] [0.360] [0.121] [0.322] [0.429] [0.201] 
Aid^2 -0.015 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.007 0.000 
 [0.010] [0.003] [0.001] [0.002] [0.004] [0.002] 
Small Donors (N<10%) -0.015 0.239 -0.046 -0.057 0.000 0.127** 
[0.088] [0.200] [0.102] [0.108] [0.188] [0.063] 
Aid x Small Donors 
(N<10%) 
-0.015 -0.007 0.005* -0.002 -0.022 -0.005 
[0.011] [0.005] [0.003] [0.015] [0.021] [0.005] 
p-value equal coefficients                0.440   0.578   0.352 
 
Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based on aid by the three largest donors as a percentage of total 
aid; N(<10%): Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid inflows. This is the extended form of the 
regressions in Table 3, displaying all main effects. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. P-values refer to a Wald test of the equality 
of coefficients for split samples. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Prior to 1994 Since 1994 
ICRG Bureaucratic quality 
F(HI) 
Aid -0.334** 0.099 0.097 -0.052 -0.152 -0.334** 
 [0.135] [0.085] [0.124] [0.105] [0.106] [0.135] 
Aid^2 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001* 0.009 
 [0.009] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.009] 
F(HI) -0.690 3.164*** 1.238 0.954 -0.465 -0.690 
 [1.230] [0.910] [0.791] [1.422] [0.472] [1.230] 
Aid x F(HI) 0.341 -0.101 -0.143 0.061 0.253* 0.341 
 [0.215] [0.095] [0.158] [0.131] [0.134] [0.215] 
p-value equal coefficients                0.015   0.183      0.007             
F(CR3) 
Aid -0.269* 0.046 0.055 -0.015 -0.037 0.015 
 [0.136] [0.047] [0.041] [0.049] [0.044] [0.017] 
Aid^2 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 
 [0.008] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
F(CR3) -0.45 2.285* 1.454*** 1.111 -0.354 0.051 
 [1.296] [1.194] [0.525] [1.276] [0.591] [0.266] 
Aid x F(CR3) 0.451** -0.072 -0.166* 0.017 0.198** -0.055 
 [0.203] [0.076] [0.097] [0.089] [0.078] [0.048] 
















Prior to 1994 Since 1994 
Total Number of Donors (N) 
Aid -0.351 0.001 -0.033 -0.021 0.091 -0.014 
 [0.228] [0.024] [0.046] [0.115] [0.099] [0.017] 
Aid^2 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 [0.009] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
Total number of donors (N) -0.031 0.043 -0.054 0.006 0.038 0.003 
[0.026] [0.038] [0.037] [0.034] [0.039] [0.005] 
Aid x Total number of donors 
(N) 
0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.000 
[0.007] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.004] [0.000] 
p-value equal coefficients                0.171   0.959   0.412 
Small Donors (N<10%) 
Aid -0.217 0.001 -0.024 -0.011 0.169** -0.014 
 [0.256] [0.022] [0.037] [0.066] [0.080] [0.014] 
Aid^2 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 [0.010] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
Small Donors (N<10%) -0.020 -0.031 -0.037 -0.011 0.028 0.008 
[0.024] [0.035] [0.024] [0.029] [0.034] [0.006] 
Aid x Small Donors (N<10%) 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.007* 0.000 
[0.006] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.004] [0.001] 
p-value equal coefficients                0.826   0.807   0.014 
 
Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based on aid by the three largest donors as a percentage of total 
aid; N(<10%): Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid inflows. This is the extended form of the 
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regressions in Table 4, displaying all main effects. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. P-values refer to a Wald test of the equality 





Table A6: Aid, fragmentation, and bureaucratic quality (based on Knack and Rahman), cross-section 1982-2001 
Fragmentation index F(HI) F(CR3) 
Total number  
of donors (N) 
Small donors  
(N<10%) 
ICRG bureaucratic quality  
Aid 0.011 -0.003 0.218* 0.008 
 [0.135] [0.061] [0.112] [0.162] 
Fragmentation -0.362 -0.215 -0.077 0.007 
 [1.113] [1.180] [0.062] [0.063] 
Aid x Fragmentation -0.055 -0.069 -0.009** -0.003 
 [0.162] [0.133] [0.004] [0.009] 
Adj. R-Squared 0.250 0.250 0.310 0.240 
Number of observations 83 83 83 83 
Number of countries 83 83 83 83 
Marginal effect of Aid at     
Frag. 20% percentile -0.025 -0.020 -0.019 -0.036* 
 [0.032] [0.031] [0.015] [0.019] 
Frag. 50% percentile -0.032* -0.027 -0.037** -0.042** 
 [0.018] [0.020] [0.015] [0.020] 
Frag. 80% percentile. -0.037** -0.037** -0.048*** -0.045 
 [0.018] [0.017] [0.018] [0.029] 
Marginal effect of Frag. at -0.560 -0.463 -0.109** -0.003 
Aid 50% percentile [0.691] [0.888] [0.054] [0.042] 
 
Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based on aid by the three largest donors as a percentage of total 
aid; N(<10%): Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid inflows. The control variables are defined in 
Table A1. Both aid and fragmentation are lagged by one period. The marginal effect of aid refers to the change in bureaucratic quality for a one percentage point 
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increase in aid as a percentage of GNI at different levels of fragmentation (“Frag.”). Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets.  





Table A7: Aid, fragmentation and primary enrolment, 1994-2013 (all main effects) 
 High Bureaucratic Quality Low Bureaucratic Quality High Political Alignment Low Political Alignment 
Net enrollment rate (%) 
F(HI) 
Aid -5.786* 1.321 -0.696 -1.319 
 [2.942] [1.785] [1.533] [2.306] 
Aid^2 -0.001 -0.150** -0.042 0.240 
 [0.112] [0.061] [0.050] [0.326] 
F(HI) -11.555* 7.638 -5.506 7.103 
 [6.633] [11.009] [12.473] [9.232] 
Aid x F(HI) 12.446*** 2.515 1.724 1.594 
 [3.508] [2.036] [2.136] [3.009] 
p-value equal coefficients                 0.000   0.953 
F(CR3) 
Aid -2.618 2.611** -0.180 0.267 
 [1.572] [1.098] [0.948] [2.013] 
Aid^2 -0.014 -0.141** -0.037 0.106 
 [0.064] [0.064] [0.032] [0.286] 
F(CR3) -27.627** 40.583 8.831 30.804 
 [12.490] [25.067] [29.574] [48.560] 
Aid x F(CR3) 23.729*** 0.154 2.363 -2.933 
 [3.810] [3.020] [3.068] [12.599] 





Table A7 (continued) 
 
 High Bureaucratic Quality Low Bureaucratic Quality High Political Alignment Low Political Alignment 
Total Number of Donors (N) 
Aid -1.737 2.028 -0.944 -0.010 
 [2.530] [1.251] [0.920] [1.812] 
Aid^2 -0.179 -0.136 -0.037 0.125 
 [0.144] [0.082] [0.041] [0.346] 
Total Number of Donors (N) -0.370 1.921 0.191 1.166 
[0.776] [1.161] [0.871] [1.429] 
Aid x Total Number of Donors (N) 0.412 0.017 0.078 -0.028 
[0.307] [0.076] [0.056] [0.277] 
p-value equal coefficients                 0.011   0.567 
Small Donors (N<10%) 
Aid -5.871 1.543 -1.961 -0.267 
 [8.581] [2.916] [3.271] [2.012] 
Aid^2 -0.450 -0.167** 0.005 0.163 
 [0.441] [0.064] [0.040] [0.317] 
Small Donors (N<10%)  -6.789 -13.802 4.211 -2.957 
[9.051] [16.074] [16.056] [6.263] 
Aid x Small Donors (N<10%) 12.223 2.158 1.734 0.106 
[14.025] [3.437] [3.288] [1.530] 
p-value equal coefficients                 0.427                 0.404 
 
Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based on aid by the three largest donors as a percentage of total 
aid; N(<10%): Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid inflows. This is the extended form of the 
regressions in Table 7, displaying all main effects. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table A8: Aid, fragmentation and primary enrolment (based on Birchler and Michaelowa), 1996-2010 
Fragmentation index F(HI) F(CR3) 
Total number  
of donors (N) 
Small donors  
(N<10%) 
Net enrolment rate (%)  
Aid -0.041 0.024 0.015 0.126* 
 [0.049] [0.025] [0.064] [0.073] 
Fragmentation -1.451 8.621 1.001** 0.859 
 [6.414] [11.634] [0.450] [0.554] 
Aid x Fragmentation 0.135* 0.125 0.001 -0.006 
 [0.079] [0.116] [0.003] [0.005] 
Adj. R-Squared 0.490 0.490 0.490 0.490 
Number of observations 257 258 258 258 
Number of countries 110 110 110 110 
Marginal effect of Aid at     
Frag. 20th percentile 0.007 0.026 0.017 0.116 
 [0.034] [0.032] [0.071] [0.090] 
Frag. 50th percentile 0.039* 0.036 0.019 0.098 
 [0.023] [0.024] [0.052] [0.073] 
Frag. 80th percentile 0.061** 0.056** 0.023 0.068 
 [0.029] [0.026] [0.028] [0.045] 
Marginal effect of Frag. at 0.586 10.506 1.009* 0.767 
Aid 50th percentile [8.247] [14.611] [0.605] [0.756] 
 
Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based on education aid by the three largest donors as a percentage 
of total education aid; N(<10%): Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid inflows. The control variables 
are defined in the appendix, Table A1. Both aid and fragmentation are lagged by one period. The sample is based on 5-year periods. All regressions include period- 
and country-fixed effects. The marginal effect of aid refers to the change in the net primary enrolment rate if education aid increases by one dollar at different levels 
of fragmentation (“Frag.”). Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Table A9: Aid, fragmentation and primary enrolment (based on Birchler and Michaelowa), 1996-2010, sample splits 
 High Bureaucratic Quality Low Bureaucratic Quality High Political Alignment Low Political Alignment 
Aid x F(HI) 0.771* 0.214 -0.042 0.257 
 [0.403] [0.910] [0.348] [0.528] 
p-value equal coefficients   0.182   0.298 
Aid x F(CR3) 0.524 0.748 -0.079 0.016 
 [0.356] [0.977] [1.410] [0.456] 
p-value equal coefficients  0.598  0.745 
Aid x Total number of donors 0.020 0.033** 0.003 -0.002 
 [0.013] [0.015] [0.046] [0.015] 
p-value equal coefficients  0.171  0.558 
Aid x Small donors (N<10%) 0.006 0.025 0.043 -0.020 
 [0.020] [0.019] [0.047] [0.020] 
p-value equal coefficients  0.163  0.000 
 
Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based on aid by the three largest donors as a percentage of total 
aid; N(<10%): Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid inflows. The regressions are based on Table A8. 
Samples are split at the 50th percentile. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. P-values refer to a Wald test of the equality of 




Table A10: Aid, fragmentation and primary enrolment (based on Birchler and Michaelowa), 1996-2010, sample splits (all main effects) 
 High Bureaucratic Quality Low Bureaucratic Quality High Political Alignment Low Political Alignment 
Net enrollment rate (%) 
F(HI) 
Aid -0.444* -0.075 -0.344 -0.089 
 [0.248] [0.629] [0.423] [0.409] 
F(HI) 1.827 -16.091 -91.680 8.256 
 [11.816] [55.018] [191.732] [12.908] 
Aid x F(HI) 0.771* 0.214 -0.042 0.257 
 [0.403] [0.910] [0.348] [0.528] 
p-value equal coefficients   0.182   0.298 
F(CR3) 
Aid -0.049 -0.152 -0.328 0.092 
 [0.063] [0.306] [1.217] [0.166] 
F(CR3) 19.898 -81.436 -206.873 18.937 
 [35.647] [89.387] [1332.585] [20.460] 
Aid x F(CR3) 0.524 0.748 -0.079 0.016 
 [0.356] [0.977] [1.410] [0.456] 





Table A101 (continued) 
 
 High Bureaucratic Quality Low Bureaucratic Quality High Political Alignment Low Political Alignment 
Total Number of Donors (N) 
Aid -0.438 -0.652 -0.419 0.127 
 [0.291] [0.412] [1.632] [0.369] 
Total Number of Donors 1.694* -0.444 6.541 0.736 
 [0.943] [1.093] [27.742] [1.190] 
Aid x Total Number of Donors 0.020 0.033** 0.003 -0.002 
 [0.013] [0.015] [0.046] [0.015] 
p-value equal coefficients  0.171  0.558 
Small Donors (N<10%) 
Aid -0.105 -0.185 -1.307 0.435 
 [0.360] [0.386] [1.157] [0.375] 
Small Donors (N<10%) 1.889 -3.161 14.956 -0.483 
 [1.261] [3.905] [10.545] [1.845] 
Aid x Small Donors (N<10%) 
 
0.006 0.025 0.043 -0.020 
[0.020] [0.019] [0.047] [0.020] 
p-value equal coefficients  0.163  0.000 
 
Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based on aid by the three largest donors as a percentage of total 
aid; N(<10%): Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid inflows. This is the extended form of the 
regressions in Table A9, displaying all main effects. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. P-values refer to a Wald test of the 
equality of coefficients for split samples. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.   
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Table A11: Aid, fragmentation and primary enrolment, 1994-2013, commitments 
Fragmentation index F(HI) F(CR3) 
Total number  
of donors (N) 
Small donors  
(N<10%) 
Net enrollment rate (%)   
Aid 0.039 0.041 0.001 -0.059 
 [0.048] [0.040] [0.047] [0.132] 
Aid^2 -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Fragmentation 4.238 12.515 0.639 -5.123 
 [4.864] [10.865] [0.554] [5.231] 
Aid x Fragmentation 0.151** 0.322*** 0.008** 0.215 
 [0.075] [0.114] [0.004] [0.166] 
Adj. R-Squared 0.519 0.585 0.558 0.482 
Number of observations 208 208 208 208 
Number of countries 69 69 69 69 
Marginal effect of Aid at     
Frag. 20th percentile 0.050 0.036 -0.001 -0.036 
 [0.049] [0.047] [0.054]     [0.133] 
Frag. 50th percentile 0.096** 0.046 0.023      0.037 
 [0.039] [0.044] [0.044] [0.069] 
Frag. 80th percentile 0.130*** 0.091*** 0.077** 0.092** 
 [0.043] [0.034] [0.035] [0.040] 
Marginal effect of Frag. at 5.587 13.246 0.931 -3.453 
Aid 50th percentile [6.064] [12.846] [0.726] [7.588] 
 
Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based on aid by the three largest donors as a percentage of total 
aid; N(<10%): Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid inflows. The table is identical to Table 6, but 
with commitments instead of disbursements for education aid. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Online Appendix (NOT FOR PUBLICATION) 
 
Table A1: Definition of variables and descriptive statistics 
Burnside & Dollar (Tables 2 and 3) 
Variable name Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Definition Sources 
GDP p.c. growth 715 1.79 3.62 -32.42 17.05 
Average over annual growth rates of real GDP p.c. based on 
constant local currency (in %). 
World Bank (2007, 2016)* 
Net ODA (% of 
GDP) 
715 5.31 8.17 -0.13 82.39 
ODA total net in % of GDP (high maximum value is Liberia 
over the 2006-2009 period). 
OECD/DAC (2016) 
F(HI) 715 0.75 0.15 0.11 0.93 
Fragmentation index based on Herfindahl index for 
disbursements, calculated only for donor countries (1- 
Herfindahl). 
OECD/DAC (2016) 
F(CR3) 715 0.34 0.14 0.00 0.67 
Fragmentation index based on concentration ratio of 
disbursements for the 3 largest donors = 1- sum of the share 
of largest three donors. 
OECD/DAC (2016) 
Total number of 
donors (N) 
715 29.60 9.15 7.67 47.00 Total number of donors (N) (bi- and multilateral). OECD/DAC (2016) 
Small donors 
(N<10%) 
715 20.81 7.73 4.33 41.75 
Number of insignificant donors; includes all donors that are 
among the smallest donors and cumulatively account for less 
than 10% of aid (based on the OECD definition). 
OECD/DAC (2016) 
Bureaucratic quality 547 1.77 0.94 0.00 4.00 
Bureaucracy quality indicator, higher scores indicate better 
quality (only used to split samples in Table 3). 





715 2.10 0.12 1.65 2.42 Logarithm of initial GDP p.c. in international prices. 
Heston, Summers, and Aten 
(2006), World Bank (2016)* 
Assassinations 715 0.33 1.04 0.00 11.50 Number of assassinations. Banks and Wilson (2007, 2014)* 
Ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization 
715 0.46 0.30 0.00 0.93 Ethnolinguistic fractionalization. 





715 0.12 0.45 0.00 7.36 
Interaction between assassinations and ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization. 
Banks (2007, 2014), Easterly and 
Levine (1997), Roeder (2001)* 
M2 (% of GDP) 715 9.54 24.61 0.04 243.64 Money and quasi-money (M2) in % of GDP. World Bank (2007, 2016)* 
* Data source is Clemens et al. (2012), http://www.cgdev.org/doc/Working%20Papers/CRBB-Replication-Files.zip, accessed 06.06.2012. More details are provided 
in “Technical appendix to counting chickens when they hatch: Timing and the effects of aid on growth,” 
http://www.cgdev.org/doc/Working%20Papers/counting_chickens_technical_appendix.pdf, accessed 06.06.2012. For more recent years, we use data from the 




Knack & Rahman (Tables 4 and 5) 
Variable name Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Definition Sources 
Bureaucratic 
quality 
485 1.76 0.95 0.00 4.00 
Bureaucracy quality indicator, higher scores indicate better 
quality; value for the year following the four-year period 
covered by the right-hand side variables. 
PRS Group (2013) 
Net ODA (% of 
GDP) 
485 5.92 9.28 -0.13 82.39 ODA total net in % of GDP.  OECD/DAC (2016) 
F(HI) 485 0.78 0.14 0.11 0.93 
Fragmentation index based on Herfindahl index for 
disbursements, calculated only for donor countries (1- 
Herfindahl). 
OECD/DAC (2016) 
F(CR3) 485 0.37 0.14 0.01 0.67 
Fragmentation index based on concentration ratio of 
disbursements for the 3 largest donors = 1- Sum of the share of 
largest three donors. 
OECD/DAC (2016) 
Total number of 
donors (N) 
485 33.72 7.90 7.67 47.00 Total number of donors (N) (bi- and multilateral). OECD/DAC (2016) 
Small donors 
(N<10%) 
485 24.08 7.07 4.33 41.75 
Number of insignificant donors; includes all donors that are 
among the smallest donors and cumulatively account for less 




485 1.78 0.91 0.00 4.00 
Bureaucracy quality indicator, higher scores indicate better 
quality (only used to split samples in Table 5). 
PRS Group (2013)  
Log initial 
GDP/capita 
485 2.10 0.12 1.65 2.34 Logarithm of initial GDP p.c. in International prices. 
Heston, Summers, and 
Aten (2006), World Bank 
(2016)* 
Assassinations 485 0.32 0.95 0.00 11.50 Number of assassinations. Banks (2007, 2012)* 
Ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization 
485 0.46 0.30 0.00 0.93 Ethnolinguistic fractionalization. 







485 0.11 0.33 0.00 3.04 
Interaction between assassinations and ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization. 
Banks (2007, 2014), Easterly 
and Levine (1997), Roeder 
(2001)* 
M2 (% of GDP) 485 13.95 28.87 0.04 243.64 Money and quasi-money (M2) in % of GDP. World Bank (2007, 2016)* 
* Data source is Clemens et al. (2012), http://www.cgdev.org/doc/Working%20Papers/CRBB-Replication-Files.zip, accessed 06.06.2012. More details are provided 
in “Technical appendix to counting chickens when they hatch: Timing and the effects of aid on growth,” 
http://www.cgdev.org/doc/Working%20Papers/counting_chickens_technical_appendix.pdf, accessed 06.06.2012. For more recent years, we use data from the 




Birchler & Michaelowa (Tables 6 and 7)  
Variable name Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Definition Sources 
Net primary 
enrolment rate (%) 
228 81.51 18.37 22.39 100.00 Net enrolment rate for primary education (%).  
WDI (World Bank 2007, 
2016)* 
Aid for education 228 3.23 4.12 0.00 23.33 
ODA per capita allocated to education (disbursement, constant 
2000 US$ million). 
OECD/DAC (2016) 
F(HI) 228 0.50 0.27 0.00 0.89 
Fragmentation index based on Herfindahl Index for 
disbursements, calculated only for donor countries (1- 
Herfindahl). 
OECD/DAC (2016) 
F(CR3) 228 0.14 0.13 0.00 0.52 
Fragmentation index based on concentration ratio of 
disbursements for the 3 largest donors = 1- Sum of the share of 
largest three donors. 
OECD/DAC (2016) 
Total number of 
donors (N) 
228 9.84 6.87 1.00 26.00 Total number of donors (N) (bi- and multilateral). OECD/DAC (2016) 
Small donors 
(N<10%) 
228 0.58 0.29 0.00 0.92 
Number of insignificant donors; includes all donors that are 
among the smallest donors and cumulatively account for less 




228 1.77 0.78 0.00 3.55 
Bureaucracy quality indicator, higher scores indicate better 
quality (only used to split samples in Table 7). 
PRS Group (2013) 
Log initial 
GDP/capita 
228 2.08 0.11 1.65 2.27 Logarithm of initial GDP p.c. in international prices. 
Heston, Summers, and Aten 
(2006), World Bank (2016)* 
Assassinations 228 0.41 1.19 0.00 11.50 Number of assassinations. Banks (2012, 2007)* 
Ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization 
228 0.47 0.29 0.00 0.93 Ethnolinguistic fractionalization. 







228 0.13 0.34 0.00 3.04 
Interaction between assassinations and ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization. 
Banks (2012, 2007), Easterly 
and Levine (1997), Roeder 
(2001)* 
M2 (% of GDP) 228 12.03 27.03 0.05 239.67 Money and quasi-money (M2) in % of GDP. World Bank (2007, 2016)* 
* Data source is Clemens et al. (2012), http://www.cgdev.org/doc/Working%20Papers/CRBB-Replication-Files.zip, accessed 06.06.2012. More details are provided 
in “Technical appendix to counting chickens when they hatch: Timing and the effects of aid on growth,” 
http://www.cgdev.org/doc/Working%20Papers/counting_chickens_technical_appendix.pdf, accessed 06.06.2012. For more recent years, we use data from the 





Knack & Rahman (Table A6) 
Variable name Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Definition Sources 
Bureaucratic 
quality 
83 2 1 0 4 
Bureaucratic quality indicator, higher scores indicate better 
quality; value in 2001. 
PRS Group (2013) 
F(HI) 83 0.76 0.14 0.30 0.91 
Fragmentation index based on Herfindahl Index for 
disbursements, calculated only for donor countries (1- 
Herfindahl). 
OECD/DAC (2016) 
F(CR3) 83 0.36 0.14 0.08 0.61 
Fragmentation index based on concentration ratio of 
disbursements for the 3 largest donors = 1- Sum of the share of 
largest three donors. 
OECD/DAC (2016) 
Total number of 
donors (N) 
83 27.58 2.41 20.90 31.05 Total number of donors (N) (bi- and multilateral). OECD/DAC (2016) 
Small donors 
(N<10%) 
83 18.55 2.39 13.42 25.85 
Number of insignificant donors; includes all donors that are 
among the smallest donors and cumulatively account for less 




83 2.26 1.21 0.00 6.00 
Bureaucratic quality indicator, higher scores indicate better 
quality; value in 1982. 
PRS Group (2013)* 
Population change/ 
initial population 
83 1.89 1.07 -0.80 3.98 Change in population divided by initial population. World Bank (2004)* 
GDP p.c. change/ 
Initial GDP p.c. 
83 1.16 2.22 -4.54 8.69 Change in GDP p.c. divided by initial GDP. World Bank (2004)* 
No. of years 
covered 
83 15.88 4.99 3.00 19.00 
Number of years covered by the cross-section (varies by 
recipient since not all countries were covered by ICRG over the 
whole period of the cross sectional analysis). 
PRS Group (2013)*  
Aid/GNI 83 7.11 9.00 0.05 50.56 Aid flows as percentage of gross national income (GNI). World Bank (2004)* 




Birchler & Michaelowa (Tables A8 and A9) 
Variable name Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Definition Sources 
Net primary 
enrolment rate (%) 
166 81.86 16.25 27.04 100.00 Net enrolment rate for primary education (%).  World Bank (2012)* 
Aid for education 166 51.78 73.35 0.09 494.18 
Aid allocated to education (disbursement, constant 2000 
US$ million). [Birchler and Michaelowa (2016) mistakenly 
identify this variable as “Education aid per capita,” but have in 
fact not used per capita data.]  
OECD/DAC (2012)* 
F(HI) 166 0.57 0.21 0.03 0.90 
Fragmentation index based on Herfindahl Index for 
disbursements, calculated only for donor countries (1- 
Herfindahl). 
OECD/DAC (2016) 
F(CR3) 166 0.15 0.13 -0.29 0.54 
Fragmentation index based on concentration ratio of 
disbursements for the 3 largest donors = 1- Sum of the share of 
largest three donors. 
OECD/DAC (2016) 
Total number of 
donors (N) 
166 10.40 6.06 1.20 25.20 Total number of donors (N) (bi- and multilateral). OECD/DAC (2016) 
Small donors 
(N<10%) 
166 6.29 4.35 0.00 17.00 
 Number of insignificant donors; includes all donors that are 
among the smallest donors and cumulatively account for less 




166 1.65 0.83 0.00 3.92 
Initial bureaucracy quality indicator, higher scores indicate 
better quality (only used to split samples in Table A9). 
PRS Group (2013)  
Log initial GDP p.c. 164 4509.39 4735.63 239.07 23362.07 Logarithm of initial GDP p.c. in international prices. World Bank (2012)* 
Education 
expenditure 
166 16.62 4.13 6.35 32.78 Public spending on education (% of government expenditure). World Bank (2012)* 
PTR 166 34.77 13.48 11.14 79.98 Pupil-teacher ratio in primary education. World Bank (2012)* 
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Young population 166 37.59 7.92 14.80 49.64 Population aged 0-14 (% of total population). World Bank (2012)* 
GDP per capita 166 4485.21 4712.06 239.07 23362.07 GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$).  World Bank (2012)* 
Budget (surplus) 166 -1.46 4.23 -18.40 35.14 Cash surplus/deficit (% of GDP). World Bank (2012)* 
Inflation 166 19.17 81.97 -4.07 1008.95 Inflation (consumer prices, % annual). World Bank (2012)* 
Openness 166 75.14 35.77 22.36 206.43 Openness (export+import in % of GDP). World Bank (2012)* 
Freedom 166 4.04 1.57 1.00 7.00 
Freedom House (mean of political rights and civil liberties; 
lowest freedom=7, highest=1). 
Freedom House (2011)* 
* Data source is Birchler and Michaelowa (2016).  
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Table A2: Pre-trends in fragmentation 
 F(HI) F(CR3) Total number of donors (N) Small donors (N<10%) 
Dependent variable: Fragmentation index (t) 
GDP p.c. growth (t) 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.033 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.048] [0.040] 
GDP p.c. growth (t-1) 0.002* 0.001 0.042 0.011 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.031] [0.034] 
GDP p.c. growth (t-2) 0.001 0.001 0.041 0.027 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.029] [0.030] 
Adj. R-Squared 0.098 0.153 0.918 0.880 
Number of observations 653 653 653 653 
Dependent variable: Fragmentation index (t) 
Bureaucratic quality (t) 0.018 0.014 -0.209 -0.535 
 [0.016] [0.013] [0.269] [0.348] 
Bureaucratic quality (t-1) -0.008 -0.005 -0.258 0.109 
 [0.010] [0.011] [0.295] [0.435] 
Bureaucratic quality (t-2) 0.008 0.005 -0.003 -0.204 
 [0.011] [0.012] [0.296] [0.381] 
Adj. R-Squared 0.044 0.045 0.888 0.842 
Number of observations 418 418 418 418 
Dependent variable: Fragmentation index (t) 
Primary enrolment (t) -0.002 0.002 0.111** 0.003 
 [0.003] [0.002] [0.043] [0.003] 
Primary enrolment (t-1) 0.001 -0.002 -0.064* -0.002 
 [0.003] [0.002] [0.036] [0.003] 
Primary enrolment (t-2) -0.004 -0.002 -0.025 0.005** 
 [0.003] [0.002] [0.057] [0.002] 
Adj. R-Squared 0.760 0.660 0.930 0.880 
Number of observations 165 165 165 165 
Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based on aid by the three largest donors as a percentage of total   
aid; N(<10%): Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid inflows. The table examines whether lagged 
values of (1) growth, (2) bureaucratic quality, and (3) enrolment influence the choice of donors to select recipient countries. Control variables for each regression 
are as in Table 2. The sample is based on 4-year periods. All regressions include period- and country-fixed effects and instrument initial GDP per capita with its 
first lag. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.   
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Table A3: Aid, fragmentation and growth (based on Burnside and Dollar), 1974-2013, with squared interaction 
Fragmentation index F(HI) F(CR3) 
Total number  
of donors (N) 
Small donors  
(N<10%) 
GDP p.c. growth  
Aid 0.223 0.19 0.074 0.024 
[0.466] [0.172] [0.172] [0.150] 
Aid^2 0.015 0.006 0.004 0.004 
[0.019] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] 
Fragmentation -0.977 -1.191 -0.082 -0.013 
[2.182] [2.255] [0.060] [0.054] 
Aid x Fragmentation -0.132 -0.112 0.001 0.004 
[0.573] [0.395] [0.005] [0.006] 
Aid^2 x Fragmentation -0.017 -0.013 0.000 0.000 
[0.023] [0.013] [0.000] [0.000] 
Adj. R-Squared 0.260 0.270 0.250 0.250 
Number of observations 715 715 715 715 
Number of countries 78 78 78 78 
Marginal effect of Aid at     
Frag. 20th percentile 0.181* 0.207** 0.117 0.097 
 [0.098] [0.098] [0.076] [0.071] 
Frag. 50th percentile 0.133** 0.172** 0.115* 0.108* 
 [0.062] [0.072] [0.062] [0.061] 
Frag. 80th percentile 0.106* 0.132** 0.114** 0.126** 
 [0.062] [0.066] [0.053] [0.058] 
Marginal effect of Frag. at -1.411 -1.278 -0.014 0.031 
Aid 50th percentile [1.350] [1.800] [0.053] [0.053] 
Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based on aid by the three largest donors as a percentage of total 
aid; N(<10%): Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid inflows. Besides the squared interaction 
term, the regressions are identical to those in Table 3. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Low Bureaucratic Quality High Political Alignment Low Political 
Alignment 
Prior to 1994 Since 1994 
GDP p.c. growth 
F(HI) 
Aid 0.543 2.237* 0.859** 0.463 0.313 1.011  
[0.507] [1.251] [0.363] [0.331] [0.445] [0.728] 
Aid^2 -0.017* -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.005 0.000  
[0.010] [0.003] [0.001] [0.002] [0.004] [0.002] 
F(HI) -2.734 13.903 0.861 -0.445 -3.300 2.875  
[2.750] [9.009] [2.527] [2.331] [3.193] [3.083] 
Aid x F(HI) -0.074 -2.248* -0.851** -0.442 -0.131 -1.084  
[0.389] [1.267] [0.392] [0.356] [0.444] [0.746] 
p-value equal coefficients                 0.051   0.375   0.197 
F(CR3) 
Aid 0.589 1.067* 0.349 0.364** 0.33 0.434  
[0.403] [0.583] [0.214] [0.182] [0.257] [0.385] 
Aid^2 -0.019* -0.003 0 0 -0.004 -0.001  
[0.010] [0.004] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.002] 
F(CR3) -2.76 8.774 0.38 0.724 -3.836 3.578  
[3.985] [7.971] [2.696] [3.313] [4.090] [2.889] 
Aid x F(CR3) -0.208 -1.442* -0.422 -0.591** -0.274 -0.656  
[0.492] [0.768] [0.358] [0.288] [0.392] [0.533] 





Table A4 (continued) 
 








Prior to 1994 Since 1994 
Total Number of Donors (N) 
Aid 0.746** 0.610 0.052 0.460 0.836 0.260  
[0.367] [0.385] [0.128] [0.349] [0.557] [0.240] 
Aid^2 -0.016* 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 0.000  
[0.010] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.004] [0.002] 
Total Number of Donors 
(N) 
-0.054 0.480 -0.178 -0.032 -0.159 0.120** 
[0.102] [0.345] [0.118] [0.109] [0.154] [0.050] 
Aid x Total Number of 
Donors (N) 
-0.011 -0.010* 0.005 -0.012 -0.023 -0.006 
[0.008] [0.005] [0.003] [0.011] [0.020] [0.006] 
p-value equal coefficients                0.895   0.065   0.341 
Small Donors (N<10%) 
Aid 0.706** 0.448 0.078 0.174 0.617 0.178  
[0.340] [0.360] [0.121] [0.322] [0.429] [0.201] 
Aid^2 -0.015 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.007 0.000  
[0.010] [0.003] [0.001] [0.002] [0.004] [0.002] 
Small Donors (N<10%) -0.015 0.239 -0.046 -0.057 0.000 0.127** 
[0.088] [0.200] [0.102] [0.108] [0.188] [0.063] 
Aid x Small Donors 
(N<10%) 
-0.015 -0.007 0.005* -0.002 -0.022 -0.005 
[0.011] [0.005] [0.003] [0.015] [0.021] [0.005] 
p-value equal coefficients                0.440   0.578   0.352 
Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based on aid by the three largest donors as a percentage of total 
aid; N(<10%): Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid inflows. This is the extended form of the 
regressions in Table 4, displaying all main effects. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. P-values refer to a Wald test of the equality 
of coefficients for split samples. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Prior to 1994 Since 1994 
ICRG Bureaucratic quality 
F(HI) 
Aid -0.334** 0.099 0.097 -0.052 -0.152 -0.334**  
[0.135] [0.085] [0.124] [0.105] [0.106] [0.135] 
Aid^2 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001* 0.009  
[0.009] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.009] 
F(HI) -0.690 3.164*** 1.238 0.954 -0.465 -0.690  
[1.230] [0.910] [0.791] [1.422] [0.472] [1.230] 
Aid x F(HI) 0.341 -0.101 -0.143 0.061 0.253* 0.341  
[0.215] [0.095] [0.158] [0.131] [0.134] [0.215] 
p-value equal coefficients                0.015   0.183      0.007             
F(CR3) 
Aid -0.269* 0.046 0.055 -0.015 -0.037 0.015  
[0.136] [0.047] [0.041] [0.049] [0.044] [0.017] 
Aid^2 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001* 0.000  
[0.008] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
F(CR3) -0.45 2.285* 1.454*** 1.111 -0.354 0.051  
[1.296] [1.194] [0.525] [1.276] [0.591] [0.266] 
Aid x F(CR3) 0.451** -0.072 -0.166* 0.017 0.198** -0.055  
[0.203] [0.076] [0.097] [0.089] [0.078] [0.048] 
















Prior to 1994 Since 1994 
Total Number of Donors (N) 
Aid -0.351 0.001 -0.033 -0.021 0.091 -0.014  
[0.228] [0.024] [0.046] [0.115] [0.099] [0.017] 
Aid^2 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000  
[0.009] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
Total number of donors (N) -0.031 0.043 -0.054 0.006 0.038 0.003 
[0.026] [0.038] [0.037] [0.034] [0.039] [0.005] 
Aid x Total number of donors 
(N) 
0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.000 
[0.007] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.004] [0.000] 
p-value equal coefficients             0.171   0.959   0.412 
Small Donors (N<10%) 
Aid -0.217 0.001 -0.024 -0.011 0.169** -0.014  
[0.256] [0.022] [0.037] [0.066] [0.080] [0.014] 
Aid^2 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000  
[0.010] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
Small Donors (N<10%) -0.020 -0.031 -0.037 -0.011 0.028 0.008 
[0.024] [0.035] [0.024] [0.029] [0.034] [0.006] 
Aid x Small Donors (N<10%) 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.007* 0.000 
[0.006] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.004] [0.001] 
p-value equal coefficients             0.826   0.807   0.014 
Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based on aid by the three largest donors as a percentage of total 
aid; N(<10%): Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid inflows. This is the extended form of the 
regressions in Table 5, displaying all main effects. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. P-values refer to a Wald test of the equality 




Table A6: Aid, fragmentation, and bureaucratic quality (based on Knack and Rahman), cross-section 1982-2001 
Fragmentation index F(HI) F(CR3) 
Total number  
of donors (N) 
Small donors  
(N<10%) 
ICRG bureaucratic quality  
Aid 0.011 -0.003 0.218* 0.008 
 [0.135] [0.061] [0.112] [0.162] 
Fragmentation -0.362 -0.215 -0.077 0.007 
 [1.113] [1.180] [0.062] [0.063] 
Aid x Fragmentation -0.055 -0.069 -0.009** -0.003 
 [0.162] [0.133] [0.004] [0.009] 
Adj. R-Squared 0.250 0.250 0.310 0.240 
Number of observations 83 83 83 83 
Number of countries 83 83 83 83 
Marginal effect of Aid at     
Frag. 20% percentile -0.025 -0.020 -0.019 -0.036* 
 [0.032] [0.031] [0.015] [0.019] 
Frag. 50% percentile -0.032* -0.027 -0.037** -0.042** 
 [0.018] [0.020] [0.015] [0.020] 
Frag. 80% percentile. -0.037** -0.037** -0.048*** -0.045 
 [0.018] [0.017] [0.018] [0.029] 
Marginal effect of Frag. at -0.560 -0.463 -0.109** -0.003 
Aid 50% percentile [0.691] [0.888] [0.054] [0.042] 
Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based on aid by the three largest donors as a percentage of total 
aid; N(<10%): Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid inflows. The control variables are defined in 
Table A1. Both aid and fragmentation are lagged by one period. The marginal effect of aid refers to the change in bureaucratic quality for a one percentage point 
increase in aid as a percentage of GNI at different levels of fragmentation (“Frag.”). Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets.  




Table A7: Aid, fragmentation and primary enrolment, 1994-2013 (all main effects) 
 
High Bureaucratic Quality Low Bureaucratic Quality High Political Alignment Low Political Alignment 
Net enrollment rate (%) 
F(HI) 
Aid -5.786* 1.321 -0.696 -1.319  
[2.942] [1.785] [1.533] [2.306] 
Aid^2 -0.001 -0.150** -0.042 0.240  
[0.112] [0.061] [0.050] [0.326] 
F(HI) -11.555* 7.638 -5.506 7.103  
[6.633] [11.009] [12.473] [9.232] 
Aid x F(HI) 12.446*** 2.515 1.724 1.594  
[3.508] [2.036] [2.136] [3.009] 
p-value equal coefficients                 0.000   0.953 
F(CR3) 
Aid -2.618 2.611** -0.180 0.267  
[1.572] [1.098] [0.948] [2.013] 
Aid^2 -0.014 -0.141** -0.037 0.106  
[0.064] [0.064] [0.032] [0.286] 
F(CR3) -27.627** 40.583 8.831 30.804  
[12.490] [25.067] [29.574] [48.560] 
Aid x F(CR3) 23.729*** 0.154 2.363 -2.933  
[3.810] [3.020] [3.068] [12.599] 





Table A7 (continued) 
  
High Bureaucratic Quality Low Bureaucratic Quality High Political Alignment Low Political Alignment 
Total Number of Donors (N) 
Aid -1.737 2.028 -0.944 -0.010  
[2.530] [1.251] [0.920] [1.812] 
Aid^2 -0.179 -0.136 -0.037 0.125  
[0.144] [0.082] [0.041] [0.346] 
Total Number of Donors (N) -0.370 1.921 0.191 1.166 
[0.776] [1.161] [0.871] [1.429] 
Aid x Total Number of Donors (N) 0.412 0.017 0.078 -0.028 
[0.307] [0.076] [0.056] [0.277] 
p-value equal coefficients                 0.011   0.567 
Small Donors (N<10%) 
Aid -5.871 1.543 -1.961 -0.267  
[8.581] [2.916] [3.271] [2.012] 
Aid^2 -0.450 -0.167** 0.005 0.163  
[0.441] [0.064] [0.040] [0.317] 
Small Donors (N<10%)  -6.789 -13.802 4.211 -2.957 
[9.051] [16.074] [16.056] [6.263] 
Aid x Small Donors (N<10%) 12.223 2.158 1.734 0.106 
[14.025] [3.437] [3.288] [1.530] 
p-value equal coefficients                 0.427                 0.404 
Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based on aid by the three largest donors as a percentage of total 
aid; N(<10%): Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid inflows. This is the extended form of the 
regressions in Table 7, displaying all main effects. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table A8: Aid, fragmentation and primary enrolment (based on Birchler and Michaelowa), 1996-2010 
Fragmentation index F(HI) F(CR3) 
Total number  
of donors (N) 
Small donors  
(N<10%) 
Net enrolment rate (%)  
Aid -0.041 0.024 0.015 0.126* 
 [0.049] [0.025] [0.064] [0.073] 
Fragmentation -1.451 8.621 1.001** 0.859 
 [6.414] [11.634] [0.450] [0.554] 
Aid x Fragmentation 0.135* 0.125 0.001 -0.006 
 [0.079] [0.116] [0.003] [0.005] 
Adj. R-Squared 0.490 0.490 0.490 0.490 
Number of observations 257 258 258 258 
Number of countries 110 110 110 110 
Marginal effect of Aid at     
Frag. 20th percentile 0.007 0.026 0.017 0.116 
 [0.034] [0.032] [0.071] [0.090] 
Frag. 50th percentile 0.039* 0.036 0.019 0.098 
 [0.023] [0.024] [0.052] [0.073] 
Frag. 80th percentile 0.061** 0.056** 0.023 0.068 
 [0.029] [0.026] [0.028] [0.045] 
Marginal effect of Frag. at 0.586 10.506 1.009* 0.767 
Aid 50th percentile [8.247] [14.611] [0.605] [0.756] 
Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based on education aid by the three largest donors as a percentage 
of total education aid; N(<10%): Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid inflows. The control 
variables are defined in the appendix, Table A1. Both aid and fragmentation are lagged by one period. The sample is based on 5-year periods. All regressions 
include period- and country-fixed effects. The marginal effect of aid refers to the change in the net primary enrolment rate if education aid increases by one dollar 
at different levels of fragmentation (“Frag.”). Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table A9: Aid, fragmentation and primary enrolment (based on Birchler and Michaelowa), 1996-2010, sample splits 
 High Bureaucratic Quality Low Bureaucratic Quality High Political Alignment Low Political Alignment 
Aid x F(HI) 0.771* 0.214 -0.042 0.257 
 [0.403] [0.910] [0.348] [0.528] 
p-value equal coefficients   0.182   0.298 
Aid x F(CR3) 0.524 0.748 -0.079 0.016 
 [0.356] [0.977] [1.410] [0.456] 
p-value equal coefficients  0.598  0.745 
Aid x Total number of donors 0.020 0.033** 0.003 -0.002 
 [0.013] [0.015] [0.046] [0.015] 
p-value equal coefficients  0.171  0.558 
Aid x Small donors (N<10%) 0.006 0.025 0.043 -0.020 
 [0.020] [0.019] [0.047] [0.020] 
p-value equal coefficients  0.163  0.000 
Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based on aid by the three largest donors as a percentage of total 
aid; N(<10%): Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid inflows. The regressions are based on 
Table A8. Samples are split at the 50th percentile. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. P-values refer to a Wald test of the equality 




Table A10: Aid, fragmentation and primary enrolment (based on Birchler and Michaelowa), 1996-2010, sample splits (all main effects) 
 
High Bureaucratic Quality Low Bureaucratic Quality High Political Alignment Low Political Alignment 
Net enrollment rate (%) 
F(HI) 
Aid -0.444* -0.075 -0.344 -0.089  
[0.248] [0.629] [0.423] [0.409] 
F(HI) 1.827 -16.091 -91.680 8.256  
[11.816] [55.018] [191.732] [12.908] 
Aid x F(HI) 0.771* 0.214 -0.042 0.257  
[0.403] [0.910] [0.348] [0.528] 
p-value equal coefficients   0.182   0.298 
F(CR3) 
Aid -0.049 -0.152 -0.328 0.092  
[0.063] [0.306] [1.217] [0.166] 
F(CR3) 19.898 -81.436 -206.873 18.937  
[35.647] [89.387] [1332.585] [20.460] 
Aid x F(CR3) 0.524 0.748 -0.079 0.016  
[0.356] [0.977] [1.410] [0.456] 







Table A10 (continued) 
  
High Bureaucratic Quality Low Bureaucratic Quality High Political Alignment Low Political Alignment 
Total Number of Donors (N) 
Aid -0.438 -0.652 -0.419 0.127 
 
[0.291] [0.412] [1.632] [0.369] 
Total Number of Donors 1.694* -0.444 6.541 0.736 
 
[0.943] [1.093] [27.742] [1.190] 
Aid x Total Number of Donors 0.020 0.033** 0.003 -0.002 
 
[0.013] [0.015] [0.046] [0.015] 





Small Donors (N<10%) 
Aid -0.105 -0.185 -1.307 0.435 
 
[0.360] [0.386] [1.157] [0.375] 
Small Donors (N<10%) 1.889 -3.161 14.956 -0.483 
 
[1.261] [3.905] [10.545] [1.845] 
Aid x Small Donors (N<10%) 
 
0.006 0.025 0.043 -0.020 
[0.020] [0.019] [0.047] [0.020] 





Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based on aid by the three largest donors as a percentage of total 
aid; N(<10%): Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid inflows. This is the extended form of the 
regressions in Table A9, displaying all main effects. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. P-values refer to a Wald test of the 
equality of coefficients for split samples. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.   
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Table A11: Aid, fragmentation and primary enrolment, 1994-2013, commitments 
Fragmentation index F(HI) F(CR3) 
Total number  
of donors (N) 
Small donors  
(N<10%) 
Net enrollment rate (%)   
Aid 0.039 0.041 0.001 -0.059 
 [0.048] [0.040] [0.047] [0.132] 
Aid^2 -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Fragmentation 4.238 12.515 0.639 -5.123 
 [4.864] [10.865] [0.554] [5.231] 
Aid x Fragmentation 0.151** 0.322*** 0.008** 0.215 
 [0.075] [0.114] [0.004] [0.166] 
Adj. R-Squared 0.519 0.585 0.558 0.482 
Number of observations 208 208 208 208 
Number of countries 69 69 69 69 
Marginal effect of Aid at     
Frag. 20th percentile 0.050 0.036 -0.001 -0.036 
 [0.049] [0.047] [0.054]     [0.133] 
Frag. 50th percentile 0.096** 0.046 0.023      0.037 
 [0.039] [0.044] [0.044] [0.069] 
Frag. 80th percentile 0.130*** 0.091*** 0.077** 0.092** 
 [0.043] [0.034] [0.035] [0.040] 
Marginal effect of Frag. at 5.587 13.246 0.931 -3.453 
Aid 50th percentile [6.064] [12.846] [0.726] [7.588] 
Notes: F(HI): Fragmentation index based on the Herfindahl Index; F(CR3): Fragmentation index based on aid by the three largest donors as a percentage of total 
aid; N(<10%): Fragmentation index based on the number of donors that cumulatively account for at most 10% of aid inflows. The table is identical to Table 6, but 
with commitments instead of disbursements for education aid. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
